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1. A Balancing Act 
 
1.1 Introduction 
With the dawn of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO‟s),
1
  humanity discovered 
the pathway to a future which before, only science-fiction movies had contemplated. 
GMO technology has made it possible to engineer plants, animals and other 
organisms to bear specific, desired characteristics, by manipulating the genetic 
structure of the organism in question, making it capable of unprecedented 
commercial use and humanitarian benefit in the form and manner desired by the 
genetic engineer.
2
 GMO‟s can possess properties which make them cheaper and 
easier to produce,
3
 or make them capable of specific functions – from rendering 
consumer products more attractive, to alleviating hunger in desperately poor areas.
4
  
                                                 
1
A term which is interchangeable with „LMO‟s‟, defined in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity , Montreal 2000 in article 3(g) as meaning „any living organism 
that possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained through the use of modern 
biotechnology‟. „Modern biotechnology‟ is defined in article 3(i) as „the application of: (a). In vitro 
nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct injection of 
nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or (b). Fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that 
overcome natural physiological reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not techniques 
used in traditional breeding and selection‟. For the purposes of this argument, GMO‟s do not include 
the genetic alteration of humans. 
2
  „These solutions continue the tradition of selection and improvement of cultivated crops and 
livestock developed over the centuries. However, modern biotechnology identifies desirable traits 
more quickly and accurately than conventional plant and livestock breeding and allows gene transfers 
across species, genera and families, impossible with traditional breeding.‟ S Zarrilli „International 
trade in GMOs: legal frameworks and developing country concerns‟ (2004) Report for the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development at 2. Available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//ditctncd20041_en.pdf [Accessed 18 June 2009] ; „For example, genes 
from fish that are known to survive in cold waters may be transferred to 
tomatoes in order to make these frost resistant, and genes from bacterium can been transferred 
to potatoes and corn to make these crops resistant to certain insects‟ N Börjeson, „WTO, GMO and the 
Precautionary Principle- the conflict between trade liberalisation and environmental protection‟ (2007) 
Master-Level Thesis, Södertörn University College Department of Life Sciences Environment and 
Development at 35. Available at http://www.essays.se/essay/5f8da94f2c/ [Accessed 12 June 2009]. 
3
 „The US, by engaging in the cultivation of eight biotech crops, increased their production by 1.8 
million metric tons in one year, which in turn has lowered production costs by 1.2 billion US dollars‟ - 
European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products - First 
Submission of the United States WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R and WT/DS294/R 21 April 2004 para 9; 
Börjeson supra (note 2) at 36. 
4
 Article 11(2)(a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
(1966) 6 ILM 363 (1967) places an obligation on states, recognizing the fundamental right of all 
people to be free from hunger, to take measures which will improve methods of production, 
conservation and distribution of food, inter alia by making full use of technical and scientific 
knowledge in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural 













The benefits of biotechnology defy conventional barriers to the imagination - endless 
possibilities are presented by this ingenious science.
5
  
However, there is a menace is inherent in the promise of GMO‟s - they are 
not proven to be safe to human health and biological diversity. Although clearly 
harmful GMO‟s can be identified before even considered for use, under proper 
testing and risk analysis,
6
 a danger lies in GMO‟s which have not been proven to be 
harmful but which may still potentially cause harm in future, which is, as yet, 
unforeseeable. Empirical scientific evidence exists both for and against the safety of 
these GMO‟s, with no weight enough on either side to prove their safety 
conclusively,
7
 while in all practicality, GMO‟s cannot be tested to prove that they 
pose no risk at all. It is near impossible to pre-emptively prove the effect of an 
altered gene in an organism, especially when taking into account the different factors 
which come into play in a real-life environment into which GMO‟s are introduced.
8
 
It remains scientifically uncertain as to whether GMO‟s pose any risk of harm.   
It is arguable that GMO‟s which have not proven to be harmful after 
undergoing rigorous risk analysis and assessment clearly pose very little if no threat 
of harm at all. This view point is strengthened by the fact that to date, no actual 
reported harm has arisen from any GMO‟s approved for trade by competent national 
authorities. It is extremely difficult to justify a complete prohibition of GMO trade in 
light of these considerations. Due to its great many benefits, reviewed against this 
undeniable evidence toward the factually benign character of approved modern 
biotechnology, GMO‟s are already widely traded internationally, despite scientific 
                                                 
5
 For example, GMO‟s will allow impoverished communities to produce enough agricultural produce 
to fit their own national needs as well as surplus to export, at a lower cost. New industries will 
emerge, such as that for biofuels, while formerly useless land will gain agricultural value through 
plants which are modified to prosper in any environment. 
6
 For example, „a Brazil nut protein was cloned into plants to improve the protein content of staple 
foods. However, the protein was recognised as the major allergen from these nuts and research with 
the gene did not continue. No GM soya containing a Brazil nut gene has ever been approved for 
commercialization and no-one has ever died from eating GM soya that contains a Brazil nut protein.‟ 
Nordlee et al „Brazil nut gene – the truth‟ (1996) 334 (11) New England J Medicine 688 at 692 
Available at http://www.africabio.com/biotechsa [Accessed 20 May 2009]; „Some current consumer 
concerns about biotechnology‟ Biotech SA Report loc cit. 
7
 Biotech SA Report ibid.  
8
An example of this is that Bt protein, found in some approved GMO maize crops, showed to be 
harmful to Monarch Butterflies in laboratory tests in which the butterflies were force-fed Bt maize. 
However, Monarch Butterflies do not feed on maize in nature but rather on milkweed. The only way 
the butterflies will eat this protein in a real life situation is if the pollen containing it from Bt maize 
blows onto milkweed from surrounding maize crops and the butterflies eat the pollen too. However, 
this situation is highly adventitious and speculative and will probably not occur in reality. It is 
impossible to truly assess the real-life effect of Bt maize on Monarch Butterflies.  Biotech SA Report 













uncertainty over the potential risks they present.
9
 This is especially important 
towards achieving the international goal of trade liberalisation. Many states take this 
stance on GMO‟s, specifically developing countries which stand the most to benefit 
from biotechnology and countries strong in agricultural export. South Africa (SA) is 
a liberal participant in this practice,
 10
 being the only African country to cultivate 
GMO‟s,
11
 which it has been doing since 1992.
12
 
However, GMO trade has caused moral and ethical concerns of the public to 
be disturbed in wild disarray, based on the potential risks they pose, especially in 
developed, consumer-based countries.
13
 While these fears cannot be taken too far so 
that they would arbitrarily inhibit the benefits and liberalisation of GMO trade, 
specifically for weaker, developing nations, the legitimate expectations and the 
overall safety of a community cannot be neglected. 
GMO trade thus presents a novel concept for states to regulate.  While 
potential risks need to be managed and controlled, even if wholly uncertain to realise, 
at the same time, commercial incentive and the benefits GMO‟s present need to be 
maximised. Law makers are thus forced to regulate biotechnology before even 
science itself has perfected its control. This task is exacerbated by multifarious 
conflicting commercial and humanitarian policy considerations which require careful 
balancing.
14





 require states to take measures,
 17
 including legislative 
ones,
18
 to prevent rights infringement by GMO-caused harm.  
                                                 
9
 „the estimated global GM crop area in 2003 was around 67.7 million hectares, cultivated by seven 
million farmers in 18 countries.... Six countries accounted for 99 per cent of the global 
transgenic crop area... . In the same year, the global market value of GM crops was estimated to 
between US$ 4.5 to US$ 4.75 billion.‟ Zarrilli (note 2) at 3. 
10
 GMO‟s have been found to be ideal and highly beneficial to subsistence farming in SA, more so 
than traditional crops, not to mention the commercial benefits of this technology to SA‟s economy. N 
Tshisela „Farmers pick GM food seeds‟ The Sowetan (3 March 2009). 
11
 „[SA] has approved GM maize, soybean and cotton for commercial release‟ while SA alone 
constitutes 1% of the world‟s total transgenic crop area. Zarrilli supra (note 2) at 8. 
12
 Report of The Office of the Registrar on the South African GMO Act 15 of 1997 The GMO Act  15 
of 1997 and GMO application process at 1. Available at http://www.agric.za [Accessed 10 March 
2009]. 
13
 This is specifically so in the European Community (EC). C R Sunstein, Laws off fear: beyond the 
Precautionary Principle (2005) at 5. 
14
 J Kinderlerer „The regulatory system in the EU and further afield‟ (2004) vol.10 No.3 Journal of 
Commercial Biotechnonlogy 248 at 249. 
15
 Article 12(1) ICESCR supra (note 4). 
16
 Article 3(a) of the United Nations Guideline on Consumer Protection 1985 (as expanded in 1999). 
17















The Precautionary Principle (PP)
 19
 is seen by many states as an invaluable 
tool in navigating the darkness of this issue, by allowing states to prevent the import 
of GMO‟s based on the fact that scientific uncertainty exists over their safety.
20
 For 





  most importantly the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,
23
 as well as in 
national laws regulating trade in biotechnology. 
24
 
As the difficulty in regulating potential risks without preventing the benefits 
derived from GMO‟s seems insurmountable, preventing GMO trade altogether, 
which would enable states to completely avoid a myriad of possible liability issues 
should GMO‟s actually cause harm, seems an attractive prospect. However, it is 
untenable. In the first place, denying GMO trade completely would be to deny the 
immense possibilities and benefits presented by this technology and will have an 
unnecessary chilling effect on scientific development.  
Moreover, prohibiting GMO‟s based on scientific uncertainty over their 
safety would constitute a de facto moratorium against GMO trade,
25
 a violation of 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) law which flies in the face of all international 
efforts to achieve free trade between states. Such a measure is in direct conflict with 
the WTO SPS Agreement,
26
 which only sanctions prohibition of goods for sanitary 
or phytosanitary reasons on a provisional basis, based on lack of scientific 
knowledge as to their safety,
27
 not a permanent prohibition based on scientific 
uncertainty, as is allowed by the PP. 
 This situation presents an anomaly in international law which remains the 
source of a deep-rooted conflict between countries. The PP is binding international 
law on members to the Cartagena Protocol,
28
 while the SPS Agreement is binding 
                                                 
19
 Defined with the most international consensus in the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janero (the Rio Declaration) 31 ILM 874 (1992) article 15. 
20
 Article 10(2) of the Cartagena Protocol supra (note 1). 
21
 Such asthe Convention on Biological Diversity Rio de Janero 1992. 
22
 Parties are free to conclude bi- and multilateral agreements regulating the transboundary 
movements of LMO‟s, so long as the agreement is consistent with the objective of the Protocol and 
provides no less protection than the Protocol provides, article 14 supra (note 1). 
23
 Supra (note 1). 
24
 For example, EC Regulation 1946/2003. 
25
 Biotech case (note 3). 
26
 The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), 
1994. 
27
 Article 5(7) ibid. 
28













law on WTO member states
29
 – meaning two equally binding sources of law, directly 
in conflict with each other, may apply to the same state regarding trade of GMO‟s, 
should the state subscribe to both treaties. If it is impossible to reconcile these two 
legal instruments, a state is forced to choose which set of obligations it will follow 
and incur the consequences of breaching the other set of obligations. Both national 
and international bodies have battled to resolve this matter.
30
  
Undeniably, there is much need for reformation of this position. International 
legislation regulating trade in biotechnology currently exists in a patchwork of 
conflicting and overlapping obligations on states, with many gaps between these 
provisions through which commercial incentives and humanitarian interests can slip 
away. Without a solution reconciling this conflict in sight, all a state can do is to 
design its national laws regulating trade in GMO‟s in such a way that it achieves the 
balancing act between ensuring consumer and environmental protection, while still 
maintaining its WTO law obligations, which international law has failed to 
accomplish.  
1.2  GMO Trade in SA  
Trade and cultivation of GMO‟s in SA an ever-growing industry
31
 - thus SA is 
particularly affected by the international legal conflict over trade in GMO‟s. SA is a 
member of the WTO, while at the same time, it is a party to the Cartagena Protocol, 
placing it in the impossible position of being simultaneously bound to these 
conflicting treaties.
32
  The only way SA can avoid the harsh consequences of this 
difficult situation is to construct its national laws regulating trade in GMO‟s in such a 
way that the measures authorised by these laws give effect to SA‟s WTO law 
obligations, while simultaneously affording itself the protections enshrined in the 
                                                 
29
 Article II(2) of the Marrakesh Agreement (1994) 1867 UNTS 3. 
30
 IM Sheldon „Regulation of biotechnology: will we ever freely trade GMO‟s?‟ (2002) 29 European 
Review of Agricultural Economics 155 at 160. 
31
 „GMO‟s approved for commercial use in South Africa have been thoroughly tested for safety with 
regard to humans, animals and the environment. As of 2003, GMO‟s that are commercially available 
in SA include:  Insect resistant maize; insect resistant cotton; herbicide tolerant cotton, maize and 
soybean. Genetically modified crops that have received approval for contained field trials in SA 
include cotton; maize; sugarcane; soybean; potato; wheat. The Council has also approved clinical 
trials with certain vaccines.‟ „[In SA] approximately R100 million is spent on biotechnology research 
and development annually. Over 600 biotechnology research projects exist at present....‟ Biotech SA 
Report supra (note 6).  
32















 without invoking liability for breach of either. This task is far easier said 
than done, if not impossible to achieve. 
In the first instance, SA has more incentive than just its international law 
commitments to apply the PP. The most important obligation SA‟s government has 
in relation to creating national GMO regulatory measures is upholding its 
Constitution,
34
 which is the supreme law of the land.
35
 All laws and conduct 
inconsistent with it are invalid and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.
36
 
SA is founded on this very constitutional supremacy and the rule of law,
37
 as well as 
on the advancement of human rights and freedoms.
38
 This entails that the legislature, 
when it makes regulatory GMO legislation,
39
 as well as the executive, when making 
decisions regarding GMO trade in SA,
40
 are mandated to take into account the 
human rights of SA‟s people
41
 and its unique and entrenched socio-economic 
obligations.
42
 In specific, this includes giving effect to the right of all people to 
administrative action which is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair,
43
 in terms of 
which GMO trade is permitted or denied; the right to freedom of consciousness, 
belief and religion
44
 of consumers regarding GMO‟s; as well as the right of all 
people to a safe and healthy environment,
45
 which would be violated should 
permitted GMO‟s actually cause damage. These constitutional imperatives require 
SA to put the human rights of its people foremost in its considerations regarding 
GMO legal regulatory measures. This aim may be best served with a strict adherence 
to the PP, by prohibiting all GMO‟s which present scientific uncertainty over their 
safety. 
However, such an application of the PP would be deeply problematic. SA 
cannot ignore its economic obligations under the WTO. The Constitution itself 
mandates SA to uphold its international law obligations when carrying out the law.
46
 
                                                 
33
 Supra (note 1). 
34
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
35




 Section 1(c) ibid. 
38
 Section 1(a) ibid. 
39




 Section 7(2) ibid. 
42
 Chapter 2 ibid. 
43
 Section 33 ibid. 
44
 Section 15 ibid. 
45
 Section 24 ibid. 
46













If it did refuse GMO‟s into SA based on scientific uncertainty over their safety, SA 
would be violating its WTO law obligations,
47
 leaving it open to liability claims. 
Another relevant consideration against a strict application of the PP is that in 
terms of its international human rights law obligations, SA is mandated to take 
measures which will „improve methods of production, conservation and distribution 
of food, inter alia by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge in such a 
way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources‟ 
in order to alleviate the problem of hunger.
48
 Preventing GMO technology, which 
would achieve all these goals, would cause SA to act directly in contravention of this 
obligation, something it and more importantly, its poorest people, cannot afford to let 
happen. 
The EC‟s strict application of the PP, without taking into account the negative 
trade effects such measures might have, has caused much suffering in other 
countries,
49
 which serves as a warning to SA of things to come should it apply a 
similar approach. An example of this already exists close to home. Namibia has 
stopped imports of corn from SA on the premise that the GM nature of the corn, 
which it traditionally used as cattle feed in beef production, poses too much of a risk 
to its beef export industry to the EC, which will not accept GM corn or its products 
based on its strict application of the PP. Namibia perceives itself to be under an 
obligation to remain „GM-Free‟ so as not to compromise its vital trade relations with 
the EC, costing SA millions in lost revenue.
50
 Furthermore, SA cannot ignore its 
heavy economic reliance on the USA as a trading partner. It cannot simply sever 
GMO trade with the USA and other GMO-producing nations without suffering 
economic hardship.  
SA‟s existing laws gave have attempted to address these concerns. Given the 
constitutional, commercial and consumer implications involved, one cannot analyse 
SA‟s GMO regulation laws in isolation. A proper analysis entails consideration of 
three main sources – SA‟s GMO Act and its amendments,
51
 its Consumer Protection 
Act
52
  and the Constitution,
53
 all of which are always to be viewed in light of SA‟s 
                                                 
47
 Specifically in terms of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1994) 1867 UNTS 
190 and the SPS Agreement (note 26). 
48
 Article 11(2)(a) ICESCR (note 4). 
49
 Zambia, Sudan and Angola inter alia. 
50
 Avialible at http://www.dti.gov.za; http://www.itac.org.za/ [Accessed 4 August 2009].  
51
 Act 15 of 1997; Act 23 of 2006. 
52















 In between the EC‟s has conservative approach to 
GMO regulation,
55
 characterised by the PP and the Cartagena Protocol
56
 and the 
liberal view of the USA,
57
 which gives precedence to WTO law, SA has adopted a 
middle-road approach, aiming to allow trade and development of biotechnology, 
giving effect to its WTO law obligations, while showing protectionist views toward 
human safety and the environment. This approach, although in its infancy, is a step in 
the right direction.  
Sadly, this collection of legal rules is characterised by inefficient liability and 
redress measures, sweeping, vague provisions and an avoidance of issues which will 
cause conflict in the future regarding GMO trade, specifically those concerning the 
rights of consumers – a situation in need of reform.  
SA‟s position regarding legal regulation of GMO‟s is delicate indeed. It still 
has not solved the problems set out above, leaving SA vulnerable to many potential 
dangers. The law needs to keep ahead of biotechnology, not behind it, to avert 
potential disaster, commercial or humanitarian. It is not enough to leave the issue to 
be determined by the courts only if and when conflict arises. This would be too little, 
too late, leading to the endurance of much unnecessary hardship. All that is required 
is for SA‟s lawmakers to balance conflicting interests in a far-thinking way, by 
embracing the principles already in its very foundations – openness, democracy, 
human dignity, equality and freedom
58
 – to create a sound legal framework 










                                                                                                                                          
53
 And its enabling legislation, such as the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000. 
54
 39(3) of the Constitution (note 34). 
55
 Sheldon (note 30) at 140. 
56
 Supra (note 1). 
57
 Kinderlerer (note 14) at 249. 
58













2.  A Patchwork of Legislation 
2.1  The International Legal  Framework 
2.1.1  The Precautionary Principle 
The novel concept in law of controlling and managing risks which are uncertain to 
happen, before they actually realise, has been embodied in the controversial 
Precautionary Principle (PP), which entails „the adoption of protective measures in 
situations of scientific uncertainty‟.
59
 „[P]recaution is used when scientific research 
has not yet reached a stage that allows the veil of uncertainty to be lifted‟,
60
 being 
applied where there is no „adequate theoretical or empirical basis for assigning 
possibilities to a possible set of outcomes‟ presented by the subject matter in 
question.
61
 Three basic conditions trigger the application of protective measures 
under the PP: uncertainty, risk, and lack of proof of a direct causal link between the 
potential risk and the feared harm.
62
 It thus differs from prevention, which involves 
stopping harmful consequences which are certain to occur. 
 No universal definition for the PP exists, as even this aspect of the PP is 
controversial. However, it has been defined with the greatest international consensus 
in the Rio Declaration
63
 as being: „[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.‟
64
  
This construction of the PP allows much room for interpretation. It removes 
scientific uncertainty as a barrier against invoking legal preventative measures but 
allows a broad margin in which potential risks can be graded for sanction or 
prohibition. This is left up to the unfettered discretion of the state, based on what it 
perceives to present „serious or irreversible damage‟ in the absence of law or certain 
scientific proof defining this objectively. It confines the invocation of these measures 
to what is „cost-effective‟ to prevent only „environmental degradation‟, but this 
concept is undefined and impossibly wide. 
                                                 
59
 A Alemanno, Trade in Food: Regulatory and Judicial Approaches in the EC and the WTO (2007) at 
105. 
60
 N de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (2005)  at 74-75. 
61
 T Christoforou „The Precautionary Principle in European Community law and science‟ in J A 
Tickner  Precaution, Environmental science  and preventive public policy (2003) at 246. 
62
 Zarrilli (note 2) at 3. 
63
 The Rio Declaration (note 19). 
64













The principle has been questioned by many states. The sanction of 
preventative measures for perceived risks which are unproven to exist appears overly 
broad and unnecessary, if not irrationally restrictive.  Resultantly, although it „is 
regarded by some as having crystallised into a general principle of customary 
international law‟,
65
 the PP‟s status as such is „less than clear.‟
66
 International 




 However, undeniable merits exist in the idea of the PP. The fact that serious 
risks may exist despite being unproven cannot be ignored and there is no other 
feasible way to protect vital interests from harm caused by this than to act to prevent 
the potential harm pre-emptively. Thus many states have chosen to bind themselves 
to the PP, through subscribing to binding international law or through the 
implementation of national laws. 
2.1.2   The Cartagena Biosafety Protocol 
In terms of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),
68
 which was 
implemented to protect „the intrinsic value of biological diversity‟,
69
 the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety was enacted,
70
 specifically to regulate transboundary 
movement
71
 of LMO‟s  between states.
72
  
„The focus of the protocol lies on the international trade with LMOs and not 
with the question of LMOs per se.‟
73
 It applies to „any transboundary movement, 
transit, handling and use of all LMO‟s that may adversely affect biological diversity, 
                                                 
65
 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products - Hormones, WT/DS26/AB/R, and 
WT/DS48/AB/R AB Report 16 January 1998 para 123. 
66
 A Cosbey and S Burgiel The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: an analysis of results. An IISD 
briefing note (2000) at 14;  EC-Hormones (note 65) para 123. 
67
 Cosbey ibid at 14; Biotech case (note 3) para 7.71. 
68
 Supra (note 1). 
69
 The CBD (note 1), in the preamble. 
70
 Under article 19(3) „which provides for Parties to consider the need for and modalities of a protocol 
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taking also into account risks to human health‟, 74 necessarily including international 
trade of LMO‟s in its scope of application. 
 It requires parties to „regulate, manage and control the risks associated with 
the use and release‟ of LMO‟s likely to have „adverse environmental impacts‟
75
 and 
to ensure the „safe transfer, handling and use‟ of LMO‟s that may be harmful.
76
 The 
Protocol specifically incorporates the PP into the regulation of LMO trade,
77
  stating 
that: 
„lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information 
and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living 
modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in 
the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent 
that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the 





This article provides a wide scope for interpretation. It modifies the Rio 
Declaration‟s version of the PP,
79
 extending its application to include potential 
threats human health as well as the environment. It also removes scientific 
uncertainty over the safety of LMO‟s as a barrier against a party taking decisions, 
specifically regarding their import, to prevent these potential adverse effects. Such 
decisions include the imposition of conditions on imports, or prohibiting LMO 
imports entirely. Which of these constitutes an appropriate decision under the 
circumstances is left to the discretion of the decision-maker. However, uncertainty, 
risk and lack of proof of a causal link between the harm and the LMO remain 
preconditions for invoking the PP.  
The Protocol does limit the scope of this discretion by mandating that a party 
is to base its decision on a risk assessment,
80
 which is to be undertaken on a case by 
case basis
81
 in a scientifically sound manner,
82
 before the first release of the GMO.
83
  
The Protocol obliges exporter parties to inform the importer party, in 
advance,
84




 even if 
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the goods only might contain LMO‟s. This must be done before the „first intentional 
transboundary movement of the LMO for intentional introduction into the 
environment of the party of import‟.
87
 The importing party must acknowledge this 
notice
88
 and the goods cannot be imported until it has further consented to such in 
writing, after acknowledgement.
89
 This „informed consent‟ provision
90
 does not 
apply to LMO‟s intended for use as food, feed
91
 or in processing (LMO-FFP‟s). 
These only need the exporter to notify the importing party of the LMO nature of the 
goods
92
 and are not subject to informed consent before being imported.
93
 The 
principle exists to ensure that the importing party has full discretion to allow import 
or not and attempts to ensure that the decision taken is done in a fully informed 
manner. 
However, the power of the decision-maker to determine the ultimate nature of 
the decision is unfettered. The Protocol specifically states that lack of scientific 
knowledge or consensus should not be taken to necessarily mean that either an 
absence or a particular level of risk exists – moreover, it does not indicate an 
acceptable risk
94
 - when making this decision, leaving the ultimate determination of 
acceptable risk up to the decision maker. Furthermore, the Protocol removes the 
requirement that the measures to be taken should be „cost-effective‟ from its version 
of the PP, unlike in the Rio Declaration.
95
 Therefore, the Protocol allows the 
importing party to take any measure regarding LMO import which it deems fit to 
prevent or minimise potential harm, regardless of cost-efficiency, based  purely on 
the fact that the GMO poses safety risks, despite this being scientifically uncertain, 
even if there is no conclusive proof that it is unsafe at all.
96
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2.1.3  The SPS Agreement  
International trade of goods, including GMO‟s,
 97
 between WTO member states is 
regulated by WTO law.
98
  Measures taken by a member to avoid potential harm to 
human, animal or plant life and health caused by goods, which directly or indirectly 
affects international trade, constitute sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures,
99
 
which brings the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement) into application.
100
 Thus, a decision to allow GMO 
imports or not based on their safety falls under the scope of this agreement, which is 
automatically binding on all members.
101
 
 Members have the right to institute SPS measures so long as the measures 
taken are consistent with the SPS Agreement.
102
 This entails, inter alia, that the 
measures taken are not to be more restrictive than is necessary to protect these 
interests
103
 and specifically should not be applied in such a way that they constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade.
104
 The measures should be based on risk 
assessment,
105





 Members are specifically obliged to take into account 
the objective of „minimising negative trade effects‟ when determining the level of 
SPS measures to implement.
108
 The agreement mandates that these measures are to 
be based on scientific principles
109




However, an exception to this rule exists,
111
 for cases where „relevant 
scientific evidence is insufficient‟, in terms of article 5(7).
112
 In such an instance, a 
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state may adopt provisional SPS measures based on pertinent information.
113
 The 
state then has an obligation to find additional information which is „necessary for a 
more objective assessment of risk‟,
114
 while it also is required to review these SPS 





 the WTO Appellate Body (AB) held that Article 5(7) of 
the SPS Agreement mandates the attainment of four cumulative requirements before 
a provisional SPS measure may be legally taken or maintained:  
„A country may provisionally adopt an SPS measure if this measure 
is: (i) imposed in respect of a situation where relevant scientific evidence is 
insufficient; and (ii) adopted on the basis of available pertinent information. 
Such a measure may not be maintained unless the country that adopted it: (i) 
seeks to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk; and (ii) reviews the measure accordingly within a 






 the AB expanded on the requirements, stating that:  
„relevant scientific evidence' will be 'insufficient' within the meaning 
of Article 5.7 if the body of available scientific evidence does not allow, in 
quantitative or qualitative terms, the performance of an adequate assessment 
of risks as required under Article 5.1 and as defined in Annex A
119





 A WTO member state may only implement SPS measures in relation to 
GMO‟s in accordance with these provisions. Therefore, as GMO‟s do not show a 
scientifically conclusive risk of harm after risk assessment, there is no basis in terms 
of the SPS Agreement to implement and maintain SPS measures preventing their 
trade. Furthermore, the fact that there is enough scientific evidence to conduct „an 
adequate assessment of risks‟
121
 of GMO‟s, means that there is no insufficiency of 
relevant scientific evidence regarding their safety. This automatically precludes the 
implementation of provisional SPS measures in this instance as well, as all four 
cumulative requirements need to be present before provisional SPS measures can be 
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legally implemented. Mere scientific uncertainty over the safety of GMO‟s is not a 
justification for taking an SPS measure and doing so would necessarily result in 
breach of the SPS Agreement.  
2.2 A Fundamental Conflict : The Cartagena Protocol v WTO 
Legal Framework 
There is a fundamental problem in the dual application of WTO law and the 
Cartagena Protocol to regulation of GMO trade. It is impossible for any state to 
comply with one set of these legal rules without disregarding the other, as the two are 
fundamentally in conflict. Should a state subscribe to both, it faces a real problem, 
whereby it is liable for breach of one set of obligations merely due to it following its 
other set of legal obligations in the sphere of GMO trade. This leaves the state forced 
to carefully decide which one it will apply and which it will abandon, causing it to 
lose vital protections provided by the abandoned agreement in the process. 
„[T]here are four aspects of the Protocol that might give rise to some 
overlaps and tensions with WTO law: (a) the scope for legitimate government 
action without conclusive scientific evidence; (b) risk assessment and risk 
management; (c) the socio-economic factors which may be 





2.2.1  The Scope for Legitimate Government Action Without 
Conclusive Scientific Evidence 
The greatest area of conflict between these two legal instruments centres on the PP, 
which is applied in the Protocol
123
 but disregarded in WTO law entirely. Both the 
Protocol and the SPS Agreement allow for precautionary measures to be taken where 
there is „insufficient information to carry out a risk assessment‟.
124
 In terms of the PP 
under the Protocol,
 125
 importing countries can also ban GMO imports because of 
lack of scientific certainty after risk analysis. However, under the SPS Agreement, if 
there is enough scientific evidence to conduct proper risk assessment, 
inconclusiveness of scientific evidence, or scientific uncertainty, „related to the 
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actual or potential impact of GMOs‟
126
 remaining after such assessment , is not a 
sufficient reason for taking precautionary measures.
127
 
„The application of Article 5.7 is triggered not by the existence of 
scientific uncertainty, but rather by the insufficiency of scientific evidence. 
The text of Article 5.7 is clear: it refers to 'cases where relevant scientific 





Although „[a]ccording to the Protocol, the insufficiency of scientific evidence 
would lead to scientific uncertainty, which, in turn, would justify a precautionary 
approach.‟,
129
  this argument is not congruent with the meaning of article 5(7) of the 
SPS Agreement. In accordance with the AB‟s interpretation,
130
  „insufficient 
scientific evidence‟ can only exist if the evidence in question is not enough for a 
proper risk assessment to be undertaken.
131
 It is distinctly different from scientific 
uncertainty,
132
 which is a conclusion drawn from the risk assessment process. Ergo, 
in the case of insufficient scientific evidence, no risk analysis can take place, hence 
no conclusion, including scientific uncertainty, can be drawn at all. However, if 
„scientific uncertainty‟ was meant to imply that no proper risk analysis could take 
place due to insufficient scientific evidence, leading to scientific uncertainty, then the 
concept intended by the phrase „scientific uncertainty‟ would be equivalent to the 
meaning of „insufficient scientific evidence‟. It is highly unlikely that this latter 
position reflects the true state of affairs. If this was so, the drafters of the Protocol 
would have included only the concept of „scientific insufficiency or lack of scientific 
knowledge‟ in article 10(6) and not included „scientific uncertainty‟ in the provision 
as well. As they did, it is clear that scientific uncertainty represents a distinct concept 
from „insufficiency of scientific evidence‟ and the two cannot be considered as 
equivalent. To the extent that the Protocol implies this concept of scientific 
uncertainty as a justification for taking measures to prevent potential harm, despite 
being legally justified under the Protocol, it cannot be based on insufficient scientific 
knowledge and therefore is not sanctioned as valid justification for implementing 
provisional SPS measures under the SPS Agreement. 
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A further conflict between the two legal instruments is that in terms of the 
Protocol, the importing country is not obliged to seek necessary information to reach 
scientific certainty
133
 on whether the GMO does in fact pose such risks, or more 
importantly, on whether they are likely to realise at all. Thus, the ban on GMO trade 
„may last until the importing country decides that it has arrived at scientific certainty 
about the effects of the products on biodiversity and human health‟,
134
 which is 
unlikely to happen at all if the state has no incentive to ever reach a conclusion on the 
safety of GMO‟s. „This in turn can easily amount to „a trade-restrictive measure‟
135
 
which „may be in force without time limits.‟
136
  
Such a trade-restrictive measure directly contravenes the objective and 
provisions of the SPS Agreement, which mandates that precautionary measures 
should not be taken in such a way that this result ensues.
137
 The Appropriate Level 
Of SPS Protection (ALOP) under the SPS Agreement is left to the free discretion of 
the member implementing the measure. However, this discretion must take into 
account the goal of minimizing negative trade effects.
138
 The SPS Agreement 
institutes a proportionality requirement with regard to the measures taken, in that 
members must make sure that the measures implemented „are not more trade-
restrictive than required to achieve the [ALOP], taking into account technical and 
economic feasibility‟.
139
 Equally effective and reasonably available measures which 
achieve the ALOP in the least restrictive way are the only measures which may be 
legally implemented. Arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the ALOP which a 
member deems appropriate in different situations must be avoided, „if such 
distinctions result in discrimination or disguised restriction on international trade.‟
140
 
When determining ALOP, a member must also take into account relevant economic 
factors, including „the relative cost-effectiveness of alternate approaches to limiting 
the risks‟.
141
 The Protocol does not contain this very important anti-trade restriction 
requirement, nor does it impose any consideration of cost-effectiveness in its 
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Thus, decisions taken under the Protocol which may be legal in terms of 
its provisions, but which do not take these trade and proportionality requirements 
into account, will not satisfy the requirements of the SPS Agreement. 
The Cartagena Protocol does provide a form of recourse to the exporting 
party, however, in that it may request the importing party to review its decision to 
pre-emptively ban LMO‟s from import, if circumstances change which would alter 
the risk assessment upon which the ban is based, or if relevant scientific or other 
knowledge becomes available. The importing party is then obliged to respond to the 
exporting party‟s request within 90 days, in writing, giving reasons for its 
decision.
143
 However, these provisions do not apply to LMO-FFP‟s, which means 
that decisions to prevent their import cannot be requested to be reviewed. This leaves 
the exporters of these items unjustifiably without recourse against the importer, even 
if circumstances change to alter the risk assessment of these goods. The provision 
also does not ensure that the importer will actually review its decision but in effect, 
merely mandates the importer to give reasons for its decision. 
In contrast, the SPS Agreement applies to all LMO‟s and specifically requires 
states to seek further information to gain at least a more objective assessment of the 
risk after the measures are out in place.
144
 The importing party, not the exporting 
party, bears the burden of finding this additional information. Also, the importing 
party is obliged to actually review the measures put in place within a reasonable 
period of time,
 145
 not just to consider its decision in hindsight and furnish the 
exporting party with reasons. These measures are only provisional,
 146
 unlike the 
measures sanctioned by the Protocol, which may be permanent. 
 
2.2.2 Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
Risk assessment is the basis for reaching decisions to prevent potential harm posed 
by LMOs under both the Protocol
147
 and the SPS Agreement in general,
148
 with the 
exception that provisional SPS measures can be implemented without risk 
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assessment if the criteria of article 5(7) are met – a situation which is not legally 
permissible under the Protocol.  
Under the SPS Agreement, the importing party usually carries out and bears 
the costs of risk assessment, although this is not specified. It mandates members to 
take into account specific factors when conducting a risk assessment.
149
 This 
includes relevant economic factors,
150
 something the Protocol does not mandate at 
all. 
However, in terms of the Protocol,
151
 the onus to carry out risk assessment is 
either on the importing party itself, or on the exporting party should the importing 
party request it to do so.
152
 The information upon which the risk assessment is based 
comes largely from the information furnished by the exporting party. Also, where the 
importing party carries out the risk assessment, it may recover the cost involved from 
the exporting party.
153
 In the case of LMO-FFP‟s, risk assessment information must 
mandatorily be referred to the Biosafety Clearing-House by a Party that takes a final 
decision regarding their domestic use, which may be subject to transboundary 
movement. These provisions are very different from the SPS Agreement, if not in 
conflict with it, making them difficult for a state who subscribes to both sets of legal 
rules to apply both these provisions fully. 
2.2.3 The Socio-Economic Factors Which May Be Taken Into Account 
in the Decision-Making Process 
 Under the Protocol, the importing party may take into account „socio-economic 
considerations arising from the impact of LMOs on the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity 
to indigenous and local communities‟ when making its decision but is not mandated 
to do so.
154
 This is not an obligation, however. It may also be interpreted as the 
Protocol allowing „trade-restrictive measures justified by the fact that imports of 
LMOs might lead to a loss of cultural traditions, knowledge and practices, 
                                                 
149
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particularly among indigenous and local communities‟,
155
 a position not shared by 
WTO law.  
Trade restrictions justified only by the fact that that cheap imports would 
undermine the traditional livelihoods of a certain minority population was rejected by 
the GATT Panel,
156
 a decision which underlines the WTO‟s strong position against 
trade restrictions in general. The SPS Agreement gives precedence to the objective of 
minimizing negative trade effects,
157
 obliging members to avoid arbitrary and 
unjustifiable distinctions in its ALOPs which result in discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade.
158
 Unlike the Protocol, it is very unlikely that a trade restrictive 
measure will be justified by socio-economic factors in terms of the SPS Agreement. 
It does mandate that socio-economic considerations must be taken into account when 
undergoing risk assessment of risks posed at animal or plant life or health
159
 but this 
is not the case for assessment of risks to human health.  
However, it does mandate that when taking SPS measures, the special needs 
of developing countries should be taken into account,
160
 something not mentioned in 
the Protocol. Due to the potential devastating socio-economic effects of pre-emptive 
action by developed states on these countries, this is a serious flaw in the 
construction of the Protocol which needs to be addressed. 
2.2.4  Documentation Requirements 
The Cartagena Protocol also regulates the handling, transport, packaging and 
identification requirements for LMO‟s
161
. However, on an expansion of this 
requirement at the first meeting of the parties, with regard to FFP-LMO‟s, 
Governments were encouraged „to require information on the name of the organism 
and the transformation event or unique identifier code‟.
162
  
„Compliance with this requirement is more cumbersome than simply 
indicating in the accompanying documentation that the shipment “may 
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This provision presents another area of potential conflict with WTO law, in 
that it may constitute a violation of the principle of non-discrimination.
164
 
2.2.4.1 Substantial Equivalence 
In WTO law, the TBT Agreement regulates documentation and labelling 
requirements. Article 2(1) reiterates the GATT‟s principle of non-discrimination,
165
 
stating that imported products and „like‟ or substantially equivalent products of 
domestic origin or originating in any other country must be treated the same way. In 
relation to GMO‟s, this means that 
„the issue to consider is whether a genetically engineered product that 
sufficiently resembles a conventional product in outward characteristics 
would be considered substantially equivalent to the conventional product. If 
this were the case, the two products would therefore be regarded as equally 




 The end use which a product is put to determines the likeness of that product 
to other products which are put to the same use.
167
 This is an objective analysis, 
based largely on a consideration of the product from the consumer‟s perspective,
168
 
in that the goods are directly substitutable or competitive with each other.
169
 This is 
generally determined by asking the question: if there was a small but significant price 
increase of the conventional product, would the consumer substitute it with the 
product in question? If the answer is yes, the products are substantially equivalent.
170
 
 Objectively, it is highly probable that in such an instance, a GMO product 
which for outwardly is the same as conventional products will be substituted for the 
conventional product by consumers, rendering approved imported GMO‟s 
substantially equivalent to other imported products put to the same end use. Should 
these two products then not be treated the same way, despite being substantially 
equivalent, a member would be in violation of its WTO obligations.
171
 As LMO-
FFP‟s are subjected to rigorous risk assessment measures before being approved for 
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import, legally they have satisfied all requirements necessary to be deemed as 
substantially equivalent to other conventional domestic products. Therefore the 
expanded labelling requirements for LMO-FFP‟s as contemplated by the first 
meeting of the parties, which may negatively impact on their trade in competition 
with conventional products, would indeed constitute an unnecessary trade restriction 
on them, as there is no need to subject approved imported products with such 
discriminatory measures. 
2.3  Which Law Applies? 
Given these vast discrepancies in the legal instruments above, the ultimate question 
to be answered is which set of legal rules is to be applied?  
In the first place, only the instruments to which a state is a party is binding on 
that state.
172
 The primary problem to be resolved is which law applies to a state 
which is a party to both sets of treaties. The Vienna Convention
173
 states that „when a 
treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible 
with another treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevails‟.
174
 This is taken to 
mean that „in the event of an incompatibility between two successive agreements 
relating to the same subject matter, the requirements of the later agreement prevail, if 
nothing else is stated in the agreements‟.
175
 In the instance that in a dispute „parties to 
the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one, the treaty to which 




The Cartagena Protocol was the later treaty entered into, being effective in 
2000, while the relevant WTO law came into force in 1995. Therefore, in following 
with the Vienna Convention‟s mandates, the Protocol should prevail unless it 
contains provisions to the contrary.  
The Protocol‟s preamble states that „trade and environmental agreements 
should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving sustainable development‟ 
                                                 
172
 Articles 34, 35 and 36 of the Vienna Convention supra (note 28). 
173
 Supra (note 28). 
174
 Article 30(2) ibid. 
175
 S Safrin 2002. „Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade 
Organization Agreements‟ (2002) Vol. 96, Nr. 3. The American Journal of International Law 610 at 
613. 
176













This can be interpreted to mean that the Protocol „stands in parallel with other 
international agreements, including the WTO agreements‟.
177
  
However, the Protocol‟s preamble is confusing on the issue of precedence of 
concurrent treaties at best. The preamble goes further to say that „this Protocol shall 
not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under 
any existing international agreements‟, a strong suggestion in favour of the WTO 
Agreements having precedence over the Protocol‟s provisions in times of conflict 
between the two. „Such a clause is commonly referred to as “a savings clause” 
because, in effect, it saves provisions of the earlier agreement [the WTO Agreements 
in this instance] that would otherwise be overcome by incompatible provisions of a 
latter agreement‟.
178
 „The Protocol includes a clear savings clause in its preamble‟.
179
  
However, the preamble continues to contradict this provision by saying that 
„the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other international 
agreements‟. Article 14(1) of the Protocol reiterates this sentiment, setting out that 
Parties may enter into bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements regulating 
transboundary movement of LMO‟s under the Protocol‟s objectives „provided that 
such agreements and arrangements do not result in a lower level of protection than 
that provided for by the Protocol‟ – in effect, preventing the Protocol‟s subordination 
by subsequent instruments. 
 „[T]here are many roads for the interpreters of paragraph 30(2) [of the 
Vienna Convention] and these clauses [of the Protocol] to take.‟
180
 It can be 
concluded that although the Protocol‟s provisions may indicate an intention that the 
WTO Agreements should retain precedence in situations of conflict between certain 
provisions, the fact that the Protocol‟s preamble and its provisions indicate a clear 
intention not to render the Protocol subordinate to any other agreements, coupled 
with the fact that the Protocol is the most recent of the legal instruments, means that 
the provisions of the Protocol should prevail over the WTO agreements in times of 
conflict. 
However, in practice, this is not always the case. WTO law cannot simply be 
ignored by a member state lest it face severe sanctions for doing so. Although the 
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former outcome is legally justifiable, it is not practically workable. Thus, little 
guidance is given on which law to apply, leaving the choice ultimately up to the state 
in question, despite the fact that any choice made will necessarily violate the set of 
legal rules abandoned. 
Where a state is a member to only one or none of these legal rules, the situation 
as to which law applies must be ascertained on a case by case basis. The only 
instance in which an obligation may be imposed on a state when it has not bound 
itself to upholding an obligation in a treaty is if the obligation constitutes customary 
international law and if the aggrieved state has a direct legal interest in the matter,
181
 
in the form of either national harm due to the breach, or where the harm involved 
constituted a breach of an obligation erga omnes.
182
  
Thus, a state wishing to rely on the invocation of the PP when it or the state 
against which it wishes to use the justification is not party to any binding legal 
instrument incorporating the PP, is to prove that the PP constitutes customary 
international law.  This will only be the case if it can be proved that the PP is a 
settled practice (usus); and that there is acceptance of the obligation to be bound by 
the rule by states in general (opinio juris).
183
  States bear a general obligation to 
ensure activities within their jurisdiction and control do not harm the territories of 
other states.
184
 However, this does not necessarily mean that the PP is binding 
international law.
 185
   
Usus is evidenced by formal implementation of the rule in practice, existing 
when states abide by the rule as they subjectively believe that they are compelled 
to.
186
 The incorporation of the PP into the CBD and the Protocol provide evidence of 
such,
187
 as well its prominence in the Rio Declaration.
188
 However, frequency or 
even habitual character of the principle is not enough in itself.
189
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A state will face great difficulty proving opinio juris exists for the PP as 
many states, including the USA, criticise it and do not consider it as binding. Based 
on this weakness, the PP‟s existence as customary law is greatly criticised.
190
 „The 




However, as there is no international consensus on the PP‟s binding force, the 
opinio juris requirement is absent, thus it must be concluded that the PP cannot 
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3.  The GMO Policy Wars 
3.1 Comparative Synthesis of Biosafety Law 
3.1.1  The EC 
Being a member of both the WTO and the Protocol, the EC is placed in the very 
problematic position of trying to uphold a dual set of conflicting obligations. In 
following with the theoretical legal point of view as to which of these obligations 
takes precedence, along with its own policy considerations, the EC has chosen to 
afford the Protocol prominence in its legal regulation of GMO trade. 
3.1.1.1  The Precautionary Principle in the EC 
The PP bears great importance in the sphere of EC law. It was introduced as a 
founding principle of the European Community‟s environmental policy in the Treaty 
of Maastricht,
192
 which later became Article 174(2) of the EC Treaty.
193
 The ECJ 
extended the scope of the PP, holding that it is to be applied to „ensure a high level of 
protection of health, consumer safety and the environment in all the Community‟s 
spheres of activity.‟
194
  The EC Treaty
195
 also mandates that the Community should 
contribute „to achieve a high consumer protection level‟.
196
 Thus the laws in place 
strive to completely eliminate all risks to the consumer. 
3.1.1.2 The Position of the ECJ 
The ECJ has defined the PP in EC law as being: „where there is uncertainty as to the 
existence or extent of risks to human health, the institutions may take protective 




On an invocation of this extended version of the PP, The ECJ upheld
198
 a ban 
by the European Commission on the export of beef and bovine products based on a 
„probable link between a disease affecting cattle in the UK and a fatal disease
199
 for 
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which no known cure yet exists‟,
200
despite there being no scientific certainty on 
whether the products actually caused the disease.
201
 
The UK contested the Commission‟s decision, alleging that it was „an 
unlawful impediment to free movement of goods within the Community‟, 
constituting „a misuse of powers‟. It further contended, inter alia, that the measure 
was discriminatory; that it infringed the principle of proportionality; and that the 
action was unlawful because it infringed the principle of legal certainty.
202
 
The ECJ held that in order to assess the legality of the Commission‟s 
invocation of the PP, it would have to balance all the interests involved.
203
 It held 
that even though in the UK, „damage to commercial and social interests is likely to 
result from maintaining the export ban in force for the time being and that a part of 
such damage would not easily be reparable if the main action were to be upheld‟,
204
 
that „cannot outweigh the serious harm to public health which is liable to be caused 
by suspension of the contested decision, and which could not be remedied if the main 
action were subsequently dismissed.‟
205
 As the ban had „a legitimate aim - the 
protection of health - and, as a containment measure prior to eradication measures, it 
was essential to the achievement of that aim‟, the measures taken were 
proportional.206 Thus the ECJ held that the ban was not a „manifestly inappropriate 
measure‟ in view of the „seriousness of the risk and the urgency of the situation‟
207
 
given the „paramount importance to be accorded to the protection of health.‟
208
 
According to the ECJ, so long as on a balance of considerations, the measures 
taken to prevent harm, even when there is only a risk of it occurring, are done to 
achieve a highly important aim, such as protection of health, the action taken is legal, 
provided the measures taken are proportional to the achievement of the aim in 
question. This enquiry is to be undertaken based on the potential severity of the risk 
posed and its nature.  
However, the court did not set parameters to the content of proportionality in 
this instance. If the risk is uncertain, so is its severity – hence the determination of 
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what conduct is proportional under the circumstances is solely up to the decision-
maker, which may easily lead to an abuse of powers. 
3.1.1.3 EC Biosafety Laws 
With the rise of biotechnology, the EC saw it as necessary to create new legislation 
to deal with the issue of GMO‟s and the potential risks they pose.
209
 It instituted 
strict legislation to control all aspects of GMO trade from 1990, which is constantly 
being refined.
210
  The legislation is complex and its provisions are often unclear and 
confusing to interpret and apply, a wide-spread criticism levelled against it.
211
  
EC Regulation 1946/2003 makes the Cartagena Protocol legally binding in on 
a regional level in the EC.
212
 The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)  was 
created to deal with matters pertaining administrative and executive issues 
surrounding risks involved in foodstuffs.
213
  
The framework currently in place includes EC Directive 2001/18 and its 
predecessor EC Directive 90/220, which regulate deliberate release of GMOs into the 
environment for experimental purposes, as well as the placing of products that 
consist of or contain GMOs in the market, with the aim of protecting human health 
and the environment. A „case-by-case evaluation of potential risks to human health 
and the environment‟
214
 is mandated by the directive as a prerequisite to GMOs or 
any product containing GMOs being placed on the market or released into the 
environment, based on which the item is either allowed to be released or not. The 
scope of the Directive is aimed at the release and marketing of GMO‟s within the 
territory of the EC. The onus lies on the applicant to „demonstrate the “safety” or 
“lack of harm” of each individual product.
215
 The product is deemed to be dangerous 




On paper, this is a very comprehensive system. However, the level of risk 
presented by a GMO which the Directive deems to be low enough to sanction the 
                                                 
209
 Kinderlerer (note 14) at 225; Zarrilli (note 2) at 252. 
210
 Zarrilli (note 2) at 5. 
211
 Kinderlerer (note 14) at 252. 
212
 Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2003 on 
Transboundary Movements of Genetically Modified Organisms; Kinderlerer ibid at 254. 
213
 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002. 
214

















release of the GMO into the market is set at the GMO posing „no risk‟ to human 
health or the environment. Already, the first problem with the EC legislation is 
apparent. It is impossible to prove that GMO‟s pose no risk to human health and the 
environment because there is no scientific certainty in the matter. By imposing a 
level of „no risk‟, the EC has not only created an impossible criterion to meet, for the 
applicant and for the item itself
217
 but has circumvented its own flexibility provisions 
for analysis of GMO‟s on a case by case basis, instituting a de facto ban on all 
GMO‟s by virtue of the fact that by their very nature, GMO‟s cannot be proven to 
pose a level of „no risk‟. This in itself has seen extremely few GMO‟s or products 
containing GMO‟s actually being sanctioned for release in the EC, most of these 
only very recently being approved for release in the EC.
218
 A conception of the PP 
which invokes a blanket ban on GMO imports would be overly broad and intrusive 
and has an unnecessarily harsh stifling effect on trade and technology. 
However, among the positive aspects of the Directive is that it introduces „a 
mandatory post-marketing monitoring system of GMOs and traceability at all stages 
of their being placed on the market.‟
219
 It is also very consumer-sensitive in nature, 
requiring the authorities who allow or disallow GMO‟s to directly inform and consult 
the general public during the authorization procedure, as well as mandating a 
labelling system for GMO foods and their products.  
The EC went even so far as to pass regulatory legislation on novel foods and 
novel food ingredients which includes products derived from GMOs but which no 
longer containing any GM material
220
 in Regulation 258/97, which has now been 
vastly modified by  Regulation 1829/2003,16. The latter Regulation still provides for 
such novel foods, even when they no longer contain GM material and also „provides 
for Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of GM food and 
feed, and includes specific provisions for their labelling‟.
221
 This measure is seen by 
many as overly-stringent as products which no longer contain GM material in all 
reality fall outside the scope of GMO regulation.  
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3.1.2 The USA 
3.1.2.1  GMO Trade in the USA 
The USA is one of the greatest proponents of biotechnology, making up 63 per cent 
of global total transgenic crop area.
222
 It is not a member of the Cartagena Protocol 
and does not formally accept the legal validity of the PP.  
The USA sees its existing regulatory system for products produced by 
traditional genetic manipulation techniques
223
 as adequate to cover GMO‟s too. This 
is premised on the idea that GMO‟s are not significantly different from organisms 
modified in the ordinary agricultural sense
224
 and therefore do not merit special 
treatment.
225
 This in turn means that the federal institutions of the USA already in 
existence „that were responsible for regulatory oversight of certain product categories 
or for certain product uses are also responsible for evaluating products developed 
using genetic engineering‟.
226
 These include the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), which is responsible for food and feed safety; the Department of Agriculture 
(USDA); the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), which is 
responsible for assessing the environmental safety of GM crops; and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which is responsible for development and 
release for GM plants with pest control properties.
227
 GMO trade is sanctioned by 
these authorities granting permits for experimental use; licences for 
commercialisation; registration of the product, which expires after five years; and for 
LMO-FFP‟s, a petition for established or exemption from tolerance under section 
408 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDDCA).
228
 
However, the USA authorities did recognise that there were aspects of certain 
microbial products which did need extra regulation which the federal government 
would have to provide outside of the already-existing 1986 Coordinated Framework 
for Biotechnology, which was put in place as a „comprehensive federal regulatory 
policy for ensuring the safety of biotechnology research and products‟.
229
 New 
regulations were promulgated under existing laws to deal with GMO‟s, especially as 
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new products have been developed. These include The Plant Protection Act (PPA), 
the FFDCA, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), and 
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).
230
 
3.1.2.2 Precautionary Action in the USA 
Despite not formally accepting the PP as binding international law, USA has not 
abandoned pre-emptive precaution in their approach to GMO‟s. Consumers in the 
USA are increasingly resistant to GMO‟s
231
  and there has been growing public 
demand for appropriate labelling of GMOs and their products.
232
 The USDA has 
made a declaration to the effect that its biotechnology regulations for GMOs will be 
subject to improvements, making them stronger and more comprehensive.
233
  The 
USA still cannot circumvent the process of assessment and management of risks 
which may or may not materialise.  
„Currently, companies creating new transgenic plants must submit an 
application to the USDA and the new GM crops must undergo field tests to 
ensure that they do not pose a threat to agriculture or other plants. The 
updated rules are likely to be broader in scope, and will encompass threats to 
the environment and public health. The USDA will prepare an environmental 
impact statement to evaluate biotechnology regulations and several possible 
regulation changes. This will also include a multi-tiered, risk-based 
permitting system to replace the current permit/notification system, as well as 




Should this pre-release risk analysis be implemented and the safety of a GMO‟s be 
severely questionable after assessment, it is doubtful that US Authorities will 
actually sanction its release. It is therefore arguable that effectively, the USA does in 
fact apply a weak version of the PP to GMO trade. However, the USA accepts a 
higher level of risk than the EC before taking pre-emptive action, interpreting the 
results of a risk assessment which does not prove the GMO to be harmful as meaning 
that it poses no relevant risk, as opposed to its safety being scientific uncertain.  
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 „In May 2004, a major US producer of GM products announced that it would not try to market the 
GM wheat it had developed in recognition that the business opportunities for the product were not 




 US to Strengthen Biotech Regulation for GMOs, Crop Biotech Update, 6 February 2004. Available 
at: http://www.isaaa.org/kc/cbtnews/bcentral/cbtupdate.htm#us [Accessed 15 August 2009]; Zarilli 













Overall, the approach of the USA is not to focus on preventing GMO trade 
due to the uncertain risks it presents, but rather to regulate it after import for these 
reasons. This measure is by far less restrictive on trade than the EC‟s approach and 
encourages trade liberalisation. 
3.2 The Biotech Panel Dispute 
The policy conflict between the USA and the EC over the application of the PP in 
GMO trade cumulated in a controversial international trade dispute,
235
 cumulating in 
„the lengthiest report in WTO history‟.
236
 The complainants, the USA, Canada and 
Argentina, disputed the EC‟s strong application of the PP with regard to GMO‟s in 
its regional laws, alleging that the EC had effectively placed a de facto moratorium 
on GMO‟s and products containing them, as a consequence of „(1) the operation and 
application by the EC of its regime for approval of biotech products, and (2) certain 
measures adopted and maintained by EC member states prohibiting or restricting the 
marketing of biotech products‟.
237
 This de facto moratorium against GMO‟s was 
alleged to be a consequence of the EC‟s indefinite suspension of decisions to approve 
GMO imports, under invocation of the PP, in effect banning GMO imports 
indefinitely. The de facto ban was enhanced by the fact that seven EC member 
states
238
 declared that they would not authorize the placing of GMOs on the market 
until it was shown that these have no adverse effects on the environment and human 
health at all,
239
  with six member states completely prohibiting the importation or 
marketing of certain biotech products.
240
 
The complainants‟ main allegations were that the EC was in breach of its 
obligations under WTO law, specifically the SPS Agreement, through instituting this 
de facto moratorium on GMO trade,
241
 as based on the application of the EC‟s laws 
regulating assessment of risk and authorisation of GMO‟s for import and marketing – 
at the heart of which, was the EC‟s strict application of the PP. The USA further 
specified that, with respect to the general and product-specific moratoria, they did 
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not request the Panel „to make findings on the WTO-consistency of the EC approval 
legislation per se but on the suspension of applications for/granting of approval of 
biotech products under the EC approval system‟.
242
 Sixteen states gave third party 
submissions to the Panel,
243
 while amicus curiae submissions were also allowed. 
In the first instance, the Panel had to decide on the law applicable to the 
dispute. Although „WTO agreements should be interpreted and applied by reference 
to relevant rules of international law outside of the WTO context‟,
244
 this does not 
necessitate the binding force of such international law to which all the parties to the 
dispute are not members. The Panel held that „if a rule of international law is not 
applicable to one of the four WTO Members which are parties to the present dispute, 
the rule is not applicable in the relations between all WTO members‟.
245
 Resultantly, 
as the USA was not party to the Cartagena Protocol, the Protocol was found not to 
apply in this instance, leaving the dispute to be settled only in relation to WTO law.  
The EC, obviously put at an automatic disadvantage by this position, argued 
that the PP was customary international law and therefore it was binding in the 
matter, allowing the EC to still rely on the founding principle of its GMO laws. 
However, the Panel held that as there is still much debate over whether the PP exists 
as customary international law, its status as such is at most, unclear. The Panel chose 
to „refrain from expressing a view in this matter‟,
246
 leaving the status of the PP in 
international law decidedly uncertain and leaving the EC in a very precarious 
position. If the binding force of the Protocol on the EC was taken into account, 
which, as discussed above, on an argument constructed from the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention, probably would have had precedence over the EC‟s WTO law 
obligations, it probably would‟ve been successful in defeating the complainants‟ 
allegations against it. However, this is refuted by the fact that not all parties to the 
dispute are members of the Protocol.
247
 Thus the Panel decided on the WTO laws 
being the only instruments applicable, leaving the EC to defend its actions made 
under its laws, which are set out in accordance with the Protocol‟s obligations, by 
WTO law standards, which are fundamentally in conflict with the Protocol‟s 
provisions ab initio. 
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In applying WTO law to the matter, the Panel held that in order for an SPS 
measure to exist, to which the SPS Agreement applies, three essential elements of the 
action must be present: its purpose  must be to impose pre-marketing requirements 
for GMO‟s, including „procedures to check and ensure that GMOs released into the 
environment do not pose a risk to human health or the environment as well as that 
novel foods do not present a danger‟;
248
 taken in terms of law;
249
 and its nature  must 
be that it is capable of affecting international trade,
 250
 directly or indirectly.
251
 The 
Panel held that the EC‟s actions under Directives 90/220 and 2001/18, as well as 
Regulation 258/97, „are SPS measures‟, fulfilling all of these requirements. It held 
that these measures „ may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade
252
 within 
the  meaning of the SPS agreement and, as such, are subject to the provisions of the 
SPS agreement‟,
253
 despite the EC‟s contention to the contrary. 
The Panel held that on the facts,
254
 „the European Communities applied a 
general de facto moratorium on the approval of biotech products between June 1999 
and August 2003‟.
255
 It held further that this moratorium was  
„generally applicable, i.e., to all applications for approval which were 
pending between June 1999 and August 2003 under Directives 90/220 and/or 
2001/18 or under Regulation 258/97 and that this moratorium was applied de 
facto, i.e., without having been adopted through a formal EC‟s rule- or 
decision-making process and more particularly, that the final approval of 
applications was prevented by the five member states Denmark, France, 





The Panel concluded that the EC had „breached its obligations under Annex 
C(1)(a), first clause, of the SPS agreement and consequently also under Article 8
257
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of the SPS agreement‟, being an obligation not to arbitrarily impair trade by causing 
undue delay in their approval procedure and treating these products less favourably 
than domestic like products,
258
 which was not justified due to mere scientific 
uncertainty.
259
 Thus the breach „must be presumed to have nullified or impaired 
benefits accruing to the [USA] under the agreement‟. The Dispute Settlement Body 
requested the EC „to bring the relevant product-specific measures into conformity 
with its obligations under the SPS agreement‟.
260
  
3.3 A Middle Road 
The outcome of this decision cannot truly be said to be fair under the circumstances. 
Instead of deciding on the matter properly, the Panel glossed over the obligations 
held by the EC under the Protocol, discounting them completely, despite the fact that 
these were the founding principles of the EC‟s GMO laws. Such a decision left the 
Panel‟s ultimate conclusion obvious from the start, in light of the fact that the 
Protocol and the WTO Agreements are in conflict with regard to mandating the 
measures taken in relation to the risks posed by trade in GMO‟s.  Although it is true 
that the EC still held obligations under its WTO agreements, simplistically applying 
only WTO law in the case did not give effect to the binding nature that the Protocol 
holds in international law, a position which is erroneous. Even if the Protocol could 
not be used as all parties to the dispute were not members to it, it still should have 
been taken into account as binding authority on the EC when reviewing the EC‟s 
actions which decidedly would‟ve influenced the position of the EC in the dispute. It 
is unfortunate that the Panel missed this valuable opportunity to attempt to 
harmonize the conflict of laws in this situation. 
The Panel‟s decision cannot be so heavily criticised, however, as the 
conflicting laws regulating trade in GMO‟s most likely cannot be reconciled. It had 
to pick a route to come to the fairest decision, which in the circumstances, it did. 
However the methods taken to reach this decision cannot be said to be sound in 
principle as the Protocol cannot simply be ignored. To mitigate the effect of this 
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finding, the Panel was correct in only reviewing the actions taken by the EC under its 
legislation and not attacking the legislation itself.
 261
   
However, although the PP may have given the EC an avenue of justification 
of these actions if it were permitted to rely on it, the de facto moratorium would still 
have breached WTO law. The Panel was correct in finding that an absolute ban on 
GMO trade constituted an unacceptable restriction on international trade.  
The solution to this blunder of legal rules is far from clear. International trade 
should not be arbitrarily restricted, while health and safety measures should not be 
undermined. 
 „social, cultural and ethical attitudes to the technology have driven the 
dispute from the outset. Any process that seeks to marginalize such concerns... or... 
rule in favour of one side over the other runs the risk of deepening distrust in a way 
that, as the EU institutions have already witnessed, threatens the very goal of 






  opines that „if we have one rule saying that trade liberalization is 
to prevail and another saying that taking a precautionary approach is more important 
than de-regulating trade, subsequently a third rule which is independent of the other 
two is needed to decide which one is to govern the issue‟ in each circumstance.
264
 
Perhaps a third international law instrument is needed which reconciles these 
conflicting provisions and gives a clear light to guide the issue of regulating trade in 
GMO‟s, especially on an international level. 
However, as idealistic as this solution is, it is not practical. With the immense 
policy differences between states regarding GMO‟s and an even more deep-set 
conflict over the PP, international consensus on a set of rules incorporating every 
state‟s most important considerations is extremely unlikely.  
A legal regulatory solution for trade in GMO consumer products is 
undoubtedly needed,
265
 perhaps a legislative reform which at least incorporates trade-
impact considerations into the Protocol, or includes scientific uncertainty as 
justification for the invocation of SPS measures under the SPS Agreement, would be 
the answer.  
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However, until and if this happens, the best a state can do is to analyse all the 
areas of conflict surrounding GMO regulation, in light of its individual international 
law obligations, in order to formulate its domestic GMO legislation in such a way 
that solves the problems the international law community cannot. What is needed is a 
flexible, middle-road approach, which manages and controls risks before they realise 






























4.  Gaps in the Patchwork  
4.1 The Precautionary Principle in Practice – a Conflict of 
Interests 
The application of the PP has been widely criticised due to its severe socio-economic 
effects in relation to trade in GMO‟s. The problem mainly stems from the fact that no 
mandate exists to take into account minimizing negative trade effects or the position 
of developing countries when taking these measures under the Protocol, leading to 
much international unrest. 
4.1.1 Domestic Dissention 
Even on a national level, within the EC, the failure of authorities to take into account 
the negative economic impacts of their actions when invoking the PP in relation to 
GMO trade has caused dissention. An example of this recently occurred in 
Germany,
266
 when an Augsburg district court in Bavaria ordered a local honey 
supplier to stop selling, or even giving away, his honey, leaving the honey to be put 
through a waste incineration facility,
267
 after tests on samples of the honey reflected 
that up to 7 per cent of the pollen collected by his bees was adventitiously from GM 
plants in the Bavarian State Research Centre for Agriculture.
268
 A €10,000 loss of 
profit resulted due to this forced destruction of honey on account of the PP‟s strict 
application by the judicial authority in this instance.
269
 The matter is pending appeal 
in the highest court in Germany for consideration.
270
 
The court‟s decision appears to be arbitrary and disproportionate. Had the 
court been mandated to take into account the socio-economic consequences of its 
actions, it is likely that at least a less restrictive measure would‟ve been taken, saving 
the supplier much unnecessary expense. 
4.1.2 Economic Manipulation 
For developing countries, the PP is not just a bone of contention between states based 
on principles but rather, it presents the basis for potential humanitarian and economic 
crises.  
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 MON801, a common GMO cultivated inter alia in SA. 
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For most developing countries, agricultural export to developed countries, in 
specific, the EC, is a vital source of revenue. A developing country, with a weak 
economy and filled with some of the poorest people in the world, is not in a position 
to bargain over the correct approach to GMO regulation with its wealthy and 
powerful trading partners.  
„[Developing] countries find themselves in a particularly difficult 
situation: in order to preserve their export opportunities, especially towards 
markets that are sceptical about bioengineered products, they may need to be 
“GM- free”. This means not only that they should not be exporters of GMOs, 
but also that they should not be producers of GMOs for domestic 




This absolute avoidance of GMO‟s
272
 is, inter alia, an indirect result of the 
application of the EC‟s GMO laws. Resultantly, the EC‟s GMO laws have a practical 
extraterritorial effect in developing countries. This is deeply problematic, specifically 
because of the immense value of using GMO‟s for food aid and in sustainable 
farming, which allows poor farmers to produce more yield from GM crops at a lower 
cost than traditional crops, even in desolate and impoverished conditions.
273
  
4.1.3 The PP as a Humanitarian Crisis 
In 2002, due to severe food shortages in Zambia,
274
 the USA donated thousands of 
tons of maize to it.
275
 Zambian scientists and economists subsequently visited 
American maize farms and silos, conducting research as to the type of maize crop 
grown there, concluding that the American corn sent to Zambia most probably 
contained GMOs. The Zambian government subsequently refused
276
 the maize 
donation, stating that due to the „inconclusiveness of studies on the health risks of 
genetically modified foods‟,
277
 the PP dictated that the maize should be rejected. The 
USA offered to mill the maize so that contamination could not take place but Zambia 
did not accept. 
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It cannot be denied that there are potential risks involved in GMOs or that 
States have human rights obligations embodied in many international covenants,
278
 
which bind them to protect their citizens from potential harm caused by GMO‟s by 
putting in place laws and taking steps which ensure their protection.
279
 The Zambian 
government may have taken its own such obligations into account in applying the 
PP. But was its fear for its citizens‟ health justified or irrational, especially in the face 
of the long term, safe use of such crops in other nations?
280
  More pointedly, was its 
fear of potentially violating human rights obligations through sanctioning the use of 
GMO‟s justified to the extent that it could refuse the food aid and in so doing, violate 
the human rights of its people in an immediate and more severe way by depriving 
them of feasibly the only readily available food source and ensuring for many of 
them certain death?  
This seems blatantly unlikely. It is obvious that the certain threat of death due 
to starvation is infinitely worse than the unproven, unidentified and potentially non-
existent risks of GM maize,
281
 especially in a humanitarian crisis such as that which 
Zambia was facing in the wake of mass starvation. In fact, states have an obligation 
to use science and technology to alleviate hunger.
282
 Deliberations over contingent 
and potentially phantom dangers hiding in the only actual source of salvation in such 
an instance seems absurd.  
Furthermore, certain Zambian government officials expressed concern that 
the donated GM maize crops would be planted on Zambian soil and that therefore 
their seeds might contaminate Zambia‟s export maize intended for sale in the EC, as 
a reason for rejecting the food aid. The extremely strict approach
283
 of the PP which 
is applied in the EC necessitated that Zambia remain GM-free or face a de facto ban 
on export to the EC.
284
 The fourth-world state of Zambia
285
 would face almost 
certain economic collapse in its agricultural sector due to the severance of its 
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financial lifeblood in being denied trade with the EC, its main trading partner,
286
 a 
situation it could not allow to take place.   
It was estimated by the WHO that 2.9 million people were vulnerable to 
starve to death due to this refusal by the Zambian government to accept American 
food aid and even a „conservative scenario‟ would see 35000 people in the country 
dying from starvation if no alternative food aid was found.
287
 Sunstein rightly 
questions whether this refusal to accept the corn was truly precautionary in nature.
288
 
The question is resonant. 
 A similar situation occurred in Zimbabwe in 2002, when the Zimbabwean 
Government agreed to allow GMO food aid into the country, „provided it was milled 
immediately upon arrival to avoid any possible contamination of local varieties‟,
289
 
after initially rejecting the food aid due to its GMO nature and the threat such GMOs 
posed to Zimbabwe‟s beef exports to the EC and to local maize varieties.
290
 
Similarly, Uganda has allowed GMO imports under the provision that they be used 
only for „consumption and not for cultivation‟.
291
 Other African states have followed 
suit. „Sudan has requested that GM food aid be certified “GM free” [although the 
Sudanese Government has put in place an interim waiver on the GM food restrictions 
until January 2005] and Angola will accept GM food aid only on condition that the 
whole GM grain is first milled.‟
292
 The fact that the Sudanese government has 
temporarily waived the restriction on GMO food aid, despite the massive negative 
trade implications of this action, underlines how truly desperate the need for food aid 
is in the country. 
 Preventing possible damage to EC consumers from GMO foods which more 
than likely will pose no risk of harm at all, on the basis that it cannot be proved that a 
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level of „no risk‟ exists in these products, is causing actual and far more severe harm 
to the people of countries like Sudan who are literally starving to death.  
 „The international policy conflict over GMOs is fragmenting international 
markets, thereby decreasing economies of scale‟.
293
 This has forced developing 
countries to follow laws put in place by their trading partners based on the principles 
of their trading partners and not on their own principles and needs. There is an 
increasing level of urgency to address the harsh extra-territorial effect of the EC‟s 
GMO laws on African countries, based on the severe economic effects this has 
caused. 
„Some trade diverting effects [in developing countries] are allegedly 
already taking place because of company practices to replace some inputs 
with others (which do not bear the risk of being genetically modified) or to 
use inputs coming from alternative countries, which are supposed to be “GM-
free”, to avoid cumbersome documentation and traceability requirements, as 




In 2004, representative groups from 15 African countries „representing 
farmer, consumer and environmental organizations‟ protested to the World Food 
Programme (WFP)
295
 over the WFP and USAID‟s pressure on Sudan and Angola to 
change their decision to restrict GM food aid. Their contention was that non-GM 
food aid was readily available and should be sent instead of GM food aid. The 
submission was heavily influenced by the economic pressure put on these private 
parties to remain „GM-free‟. However, it is by far more costly and difficult for the 
WFP to supply conventional food aid or milled food aid than GMO food aid. The 
WFP contended that  the Government of Angola‟s mandatory milling requirements 
for GMO food aid implicated „substantial extra costs‟ and would „cause shipment 
delays of up to two months.‟ It would „further aggravate an already serious funding 
situation where the WFP has received only 24 per cent of the funds it asked for under 
its current operation in the country. As a consequence, WFP is to halve the food 
rations given to the majority of the 1.9 million people it assists in Angola.‟
296
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Is it truly that the PP, or merely its application,
297
 would disregard human 
rights in the interest of preventing unknown and very possibly imaginary risks to 
such an extent that its price is tolled in human lives? No doubt the EC‟s application 
of the PP in its own laws has factually infringed the principle of sovereignty of state, 
imposing de facto trade sanctions against GMO‟s on countries who do not abide by 
its dictates. The strong arm of the EC‟s application of the PP
298
 has forced all states 
which depend on the its trade to follow the same practices with regard to GM 
foodstuffs as it does, regardless of whether this approach is in line with the principles 
of the country in question and moreover, regardless of whether the application of the 
PP in such a way is correct, or if the principle is correct at all. 
4.1.4 Regional Reaction 
The EC‟s GMO laws‟ ripple effect on African countries has even triggered a large-
scale regional reaction.  The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
addressed the problem in 2003 in the form of approving the recommendations on 
Biotechnology and Biosafety created by the SADC Advisory Committee. The 
measure, although intended to be for the interim, was greatly innovative in 
addressing these sensitive areas of economic and humanitarian conflict.  
„The recommendations are divided into four main sections: Handling 
Food Aid; Policy and Regulations; Capacity Building; and Public Awareness 
and Participation. Under “Handling Food Aid”, donors providing GM food 
aid should comply with the Prior Informed Consent principle and with the 
notification requirements in accordance with Article 8 of the Biosafety 
Protocol. Food aid consignments containing GM grain should be milled or 
sterilized prior to distribution to beneficiary populations. The sourcing of 
food aid should be within the region, and the region should develop and adopt 
a harmonized transit in a safe and expeditious manner. GM food aid in transit 
should be clearly identified and labelled in accordance with national 
legislation. In the absence of such a system, it is recommended that countries 





 As part of this incentive and in accordance with the goal of achieving 
international harmonisation of laws to reduce conflict situations, SADC countries are 
encouraged „to develop national biotechnology policies and strategies to exploit the 
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benefits of biotechnology, to establish national biosafety regulatory systems and to 




Based on these recommendations, SADC passed guidelines in respect of the 
management of GM food aid by developing SADC countries, which give full effect 
to the Advisory Committee‟s Recommendations.
301
 The recommendations advise 
that the preoccupation of health and environmental risks, as well as the threat to trade 
relations posed by GMO‟s  „must be balanced with Governments' responsibility to 
improve the quantity and quality of agricultural and food production made available 




The guidelines are, no doubt, a step in the right direction. This is especially so 
when considering the immediate problems these African countries face from the 
effect EC‟s GMO laws as they are, providing a loophole way to stay „GM Free‟ for 
all trade purposes, while allowing food aid to reach the starving populace and save 
millions of lives in the process. However, the guidelines are only satisfactory as 
interim relief. Although harmony of national laws regarding GMO‟s on an 
international scale will reduce conflict in the area of GMO trade, uniformity of the 
strict application of the PP toward GMO‟s as sanctioned by the EC will not solve the 
root of the problem and in the long run, will only exacerbate the economic and 
humanitarian suffering of the general public in developing countries. The guidelines 
tolerate and make adaptations to fit the EC‟s strict application of the PP in GMO law 
and in so doing, as illustrated by the example of the WFP in Angola, will make food 
aid measures slower, more expensive and less in quantity due to these cost 
restrictions, meaning a great number of people in need will not receive food aid at all 
under these new legislative mandates.  
4.2       An Enlightened PP 
The PP cannot be abandoned due to the vital role it serves. Despite the negative 
effects of the PP in practice, a total lack of it would leave states helpless to prevent 
grave and irreparable harm caused by the realisation of formerly uncertain risks. 
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Some manner of pre-emptive precaution is undoubtedly needed where the danger of 
scientifically uncertain risks occurs, as is the case with GMO‟s.  
 However, the legal sanction of taking precautionary measures to prevent the 
harm caused by scientifically uncertain risks needs stricter regulation, so as not to 
cause the harsh socio-economic suffering the strict application of the PP has caused 
in the past. Rather, an evolved manner of regulating uncertain risks in GMO trade is 
needed. The onus lies on the stronger trading partners of weaker developing 
countries to develop the application of the PP with regard to GMO trade for the sake 
of developing nations and improve this current position.  
 If the decision-maker is also mandated to take into account the impact these 
measures will have on international trade and socio-economic conditions, 
specifically in developing countries, coupled with a duty to seek certainty over the 
risks and review the measures within a reasonable time, the negative effects of taking 
pre-emptive precautionary measures will be greatly mitigated, while overall, the risk 
evaluation process will become more broad-based and objective. Lowering the level 
of risk acceptable from only allowing GMOs posing „no risk‟ to be traded, to a level 
of „highly unlikely for risk to materialise‟ or „reasonably low risk‟ instead will also 
help this cause. This forms an „enlightened‟ pre-emptive approach to risks - one 
which merges the obligations of the SPS Agreement with the Protections of the 
Protocol, putting legal parameters in place so that this discretion is not left to be 
arbitrary and overly broad, amounting to an application of the PP in such a strict 
manner that any risk at all is grounds for a blanket ban on GMO trade 
Ideally, this should constitute a legally binding obligation on the decision-
maker, giving a source of recourse to states injured due to breach of this obligation. 
However, to the extent that all that all that is required is for the decision-maker to 
apply his mind to these factors, a failure of which would at least need to be justified 
even if only on an administrative level, such a position would still lessen the hash 
extra-territorial effect of these laws, encouraging developing countries to more 
openly accept GMO food aid which is at least certified to be low in risk and meet 
their international human rights law obligations without fear of violating their 













5. Closing the Gaps 
5.1  The South African Solution 
Subscribing to both the WTO and the Protocol, SA finds itself torn between 
upholding conflicting international law obligations regarding GMO trade. SA has 
chosen to construct its national laws somewhere in between the two. This 
enlightened approach towards merging these obligations is to be congratulated. 
However, it is incomplete and certainly not without problems, succeeding more in 
avoiding issues of conflict between these dual obligations rather than actually 
harmonizing them. SA‟s problems in this regard are more complex than most 
countries, as it not only has to comply with its international law obligations to avoid 
liability but it also cannot contravene its own constitutional obligations in the 
process, lest it undermine its very own foundations.
303
 
 Three main sources need to be considered in order to fully analyse the 
sufficiency of SA‟s legal regulatory system for GMO trade in terms of its many 
obligations, being GMO legislation, the Constitution and Consumer Protection 
legislation. 
5.2 GMO Legislation in SA 
When GMO‟s were first permitted for use in SA in 1992, no legal framework existed 
to regulate their use, movement and release. Instead, a committee
304
 was established 
„to advise government, industry and the public on the safety of GMO‟s‟.
305
 It was 
„responsible for the evaluation of risk assessments, i.e. food, feed and environmental 
impact assessments, of all applications requesting authorisation to conduct activities 
with GMO‟s‟.
306
 These were to be carried out via permits issued under an 
amendment to the Agricultural Pest Act No. 36 of 1983. This position was in line 
with WTO law‟s principle of non-discrimination,
307
 treating GMO‟s as substantially 
equivalent to other modified organisms, placing them under the ambit of existing 
legislation. 
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This position has now changed. The Genetically Modified Organisms Act 
No. 15 of 1997 came into force in December 1999, with Regulations,
308
 specifically 
applying to the genetic modification of organisms
309
 and their development, 
production, release and use, including gene therapy
310
 but excluding, inter alia, 
human gene therapy.
311
 The Act shows that SA has recognised a difference inherent 
in GMO products and thus saw the need to implement specific legislation for their 
regulation. In 2007, the Genetically Modified Organisms Amendment Act 23 of 2006 
came into force, incorporating the Protocol
312
 and thus the PP
313
 as binding law in 
SA.
314
 Although its incorporation leaned SA‟s legislative structure in favour of the 
Protocol, the actual provisions of the Amendment Act do not exclude SA‟s WTO law 
obligations, aiming to merge the two sets of obligations in SA national legislation.  
The Regulations mandate that besides complying with its own provisions, an 
applicant applying for a permit to trade GMO‟s must also comply with the provisions 
of all other laws regulating the importation and exportation of GMO‟s.
315
 This 
necessarily includes the application of both the Protocol and the WTO agreements.  
The Amendment Act incorporates a duty on the Council to take into account 
scientifically based risk assessments
316
 and proposed risk management measures,
317
 
in considering applications to permit GMO‟s and related activities into SA, giving 
effect to the obligation common to both the SPS Agreement and the Protocol 
regarding risk assessment.
318
 Furthermore, while the GMO Act makes provision for 
the applicant to submit a risk assessment of the GMO to the Council, based on its 
environmental impacts,
319
 the Amendment Act stretches this duty further, 
incorporating SA‟s SPS Agreement obligations
320
 into its provisions as well, by 
requiring the applicant to also base this on its socio-economic effects.
321
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 The amendment was implemented on the basis that SA „cannot afford to lag 
behind developed nations on genetically modified foods‟ as it „cannot afford not to 
have its own home-grown biotechnology... that can produce traits and products that 
are suited to our environment and our diseases‟,
322
 leading SA‟s government to reject 
activist calls for stricter controls on biotechnology and rather, to make the admittance 
process for GMO‟s more flexible. SA‟s GMO legislation therefore encourages GMO 
trade, yet it still maintains the protective measures of the PP. The only real question 
remaining is whether these two can ever actually be married in this way. 
5.2.1  The Application Process 
The current position is that GMO trade must be carried out via permits issued under 
the Act,
323
 granted by the Directorate Genetic Resources Management. A „Registrar, 
two regulatory bodies, i.e. the Advisory Committee
324
 and Executive Council, and 
inspectors‟,
325
 also carry out administrative functions with regard to GMO permits 
and the actual use of GMO‟s under the Act. The process by which GMO‟s are 
approved for trade and use involves an application to the Registrar, who is 
responsible for issuing the permits.
326
 He then refers the application to the Executive 
Council,
327
 which is the highest decision-making body in the process, consisting of 
ministers from 6 governmental departments.
328
 It is the body which ultimately 
decides what measures to take and whether to permit the GMO or not.
329
 The Act 
makes provision for a party who is aggrieved by a decision of the Council to appeal 
the matter to the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, who will have the final 
say in the matter.  The Council bases its decision on the advice
330




„Members of the Advisory Committee are appointed by the Minister 
for Agriculture and consist of ten scientists who are experts in fields related 
to GMO‟s. This Committee evaluates risk assessments, which are submitted 
                                                 
322
 Ben Durham, director in the Department of Science and Technology 2006, in his parliamentary 
address to the Department of Agriculture regarding acceptance of the GMO Amendment Act. „South 
African Government Seeks Law to Extend Support of GMOs‟  Reuters (20 Jan 2006. Available at 
http://www.genet-info.org./ [Accessed 4 August 2009]. 
323
 Regulation 2(1) (note 303). 
324
 Section 10 of the GMO Act (note 310). 
325
 Supra (note 12) at 1. 
326
 Section 9(a) of the GMO Act (note 310). 
327
 Established under section 3 of the GMO Act ibid. 
328
 Section 3(2) ibid. 
329
 Section 5(g) ibid. 
330
 Section 5(g) ibid. 
331













with every application, to determine the potential impact of the proposed 




The committee makes a recommendation to the Executive Council, detailing 
on whether the GMO or activity involving it should be allowed or not,
333
 including 
which risk management procedures should be applied,
334
 from which it is easier for 
the Council to distinguish whether the risk is scientifically certain; if there is 
insufficient scientific evidence over it; or whether it is scientifically uncertain – a 
crucial distinction upon which to base its decision, when taking into account SA‟s 
conflicting international law obligations.  
 The public is notified through major newspapers of any proposed admittance 
of GMO‟s and in this way, the public is consulted for comment in this process, which 
the Council considers on evaluation of the application. „This promotes credibility and 
transparency in the regulatory process.‟
335
 
5.2.2 An Inherent Conflict 
Despite SA‟s laudable efforts to achieve this harmonization, it falls short of its aim in 
many respects, the most significant of all being the fundamental incongruence of the 
PP with WTO law obligations. 
Based on this legislation, in principle, SA‟s government can legally rely on 
the PP to block GMO‟s from trade in SA, by denying permits to GMO exporters 
under the GMO Act, purely because scientific uncertainty exists with regard to the 
risks posed by GMO‟s on human health and biodiversity.  
However, the GMO Act states that one of its founding principles is to ensure 
that activities involving GMO‟s are carried out in a way which limits potential 
harmful consequences caused by GMO‟s to the environment, human and animal 
health, a position which has not been changed by the amendment.
336
 The wording of 
this principle is in accordance with the definition of an SPS measure should such an 
action affect trade,
337
 leaving a door open to the decision-maker to invoke SPS 
measures if it sees fit in relation to allowing GMO imports or not. Furthermore, the 
legislation has to be interpreted to take into account SA‟s international law 
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obligations in so far as is reasonable,
338
 meaning that the invocation of SPS measures 
under the act necessarily need to comply with the SPS Agreement. The provisions of 
the SPS Agreement, as set out above, do not permit prohibition of GMO‟s on 
grounds of scientific uncertainty, accepting only insufficient scientific evidence as 
justification for prevention of import of GMO‟s.
339
  
In effect, SA‟s national law permits an application of both SPS measures and 
the PP when making a decision to allow GMO imports on paper. In practicality, 
however, as SPS measures are permitted under the Protocol‟s version of the PP, 
which caters for instances of lack of scientific knowledge as well as scientific 
uncertainty
340
 but the PP is not permitted in terms of the SPS Agreement, which only 
allows for insufficient scientific information,
341
 only SPS measures may be invoked 
by the authority, leaving the PP without any practical force or effect. Thus mere lip 
service is paid to the PP under the current position, meaning scientific uncertainty is 
not a justification for preventing GMO imports despite sanction for this in the 
Amendment Act. Should SA rely on its national laws in invoking the PP in this way, 




5.2.3 Considerations for the Decision 
Instead of addressing the conflict inherent in the considerations to be taken into 
account when making a decision to prevent GMO import or not, SA legislation is 
specifically silent on the exact principles to take into account when making the 
decision. It incorporates the Protocol as an annex to the Amendment Act, implying 
that the principles mandated by it upon which a decision regarding the import of 
GMO‟s is to be based automatically apply in SA. However, the main flaw with this is 
that it ignores the considerations mandated by the SPS Agreement, most specifically 
that the decision should be taken in the interest of minimizing negative trade 
aspects;
343
 that the measures taken are not more trade-restrictive than is 
necessary;
344
that cost-effective, less restrictive alternative measures to limit the risk 
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need to be considered;
345
 and that the interests of developing countries need to be 
taken into account.
346
 Despite mandating an enquiry into environmental effects
347
 
and socio-economic effects in general
348
 by the Council in making its decision, 
putting SA in a less threatening position to developing countries than the EC, the 
legislature did not go so far as to incorporate a duty on the council to take into 
account socio-economic impacts which the GMO may have on the community living 
within the vicinity of its introduction when making its decision, merely granting the 
Council the discretion to do so.
349
  
As the Protocol and the SPS Agreement are in conflict on this matter, in the 
interests of legal certainty, this needs to be amended.  
5.3  Biosafety Law and the Constitution 
As the supreme law of the country,
350
 no law or action can be carried out legally in 
SA unless it is done in line with the Constitution.
351
 Furthermore, the state bears an 
obligation to protect, promote and fulfil the entrenched rights
352




5.3.1 The Right to a Safe and Healthy Environment 
The potential threats GMO‟s pose to biodiversity and human health threatens the 
constitutional right of all people to a safe and healthy environment.
354
 Despite SA not 
being mandated to take action to prevent this harm if its realisation is only 
scientifically uncertain under international law, it has a constitutional mandate to do 
so. It cannot ignore this obligation without facing liability claims within its own 
territory. 
The inaction of the state to prevent potential harm constitutes a limitation of 
this right as it is failing to protect the right, especially should harm actually realise. A 
constitutional right may only be limited if it satisfies the requirements of the 
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 in that it is only limited in terms of a law of general application, 
to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society, based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including: (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance 
of the purpose of limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation ; (d) the 




The action would be legitimately taken in terms of the GMO Act. However 
the nature of the right to a safe and healthy environment is that it is extremely vital to 
all life, making limitation of this right almost completely impermissible in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. Despite this, 
the importance of complying with international law obligations,
357
 including SA‟s 
obligation to use biotechnology to alleviate hunger and poverty,
358
 as well as the 
importance of fostering scientific and commercial incentive for GMO trade and 
development, mean that to a degree, the right in question needs to be limited lest 
these other important goals be neglected. Allowing trade of GMO‟s most certainly 
will serve this purpose, while the right in question is only potentially threatened by 
allowing GMO trade as GMO‟s are not certain to cause harm. However, there most 
definitely is a less restrictive means to achieve the purpose in question than just 
allowing an unqualified sanction of GMO trade. 
Such a less restrictive measure would include putting proper risk 
management and safeguard measures in place after the GMO‟s are introduced into 
SA, which would mitigate if not avoid any potential adverse effects they may have in 
future. Traceability of GMOs would also aid to achieve this purpose. „Traceability is 
meant to facilitate a withdrawal of food and feed from the market if any unexpected 
adverse effects were to arise.‟
359
 Should harm nevertheless ensue, the government 
may avoid liability if it puts proper liability and redress measures in place to ensure 
that injured parties are compensated for their loss due to this government action. 
Failing these steps, the government will fail to uphold this right should GMO-caused 
harm ensue, leaving its constitutional standards completely disregarded. 
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5.3.2 Fair Administrative Action 
The decision taken by the Council for or against permitting GMO trade in terms of 
the GMO Act constitutes administrative action
360
 for the purposes of section 33 of 
the Constitution – „the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair‟ and the right to written reasons.
361
 This in turn brings the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA)
362
 into application, which was 
enacted to give effect to section 33.  
 Administrative action which materially and adversely affects the rights or 
legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally fair,
363
  while what fair 
administrative procedure is depends on the circumstances of each case.
364
 The 
Council‟s decision must not only meet the requirements set out for it in the Protocol 
under the PP, or those set out by the WTO SPS Agreement, but must also pass the 
muster of procedural fairness in order for SA to avoid incurring liability for 
breaching its obligations.  
  Under the reasonableness requirement, a decision by the Council may be 
reviewed by the Judiciary, inter alia, if the action was taken for a reason not 
authorised by the empowering provision;
365
 for an ulterior purpose or motive;
366
 
because irrelevant considerations were taken into account or relevant considerations 
were not considered;
367
 because of the unauthorised or unwarranted dictates of 
another person or body;
368
 in bad faith;
369
 or arbitrarily or capriciously.
370
 
 The purpose for the decision is to prevent adverse effects from harming plant, 
animal or human life and health.
371
 However, perimeters need to be set to restrict the 
discretion to take measures to achieve this purpose so that it does not lead to abuse. 
Although SA‟s legislation imports the considerations of the Protocol into its 
measures and does not mandate vital considerations like the effect of the decision on 
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international trade as in the SPS Agreement,
372
 SA is still legally bound to take these 
considerations into account under international law. If the decision-maker does not 
take them into account, the decision-maker will not have taken relevant 
considerations into account which may render the decision unreasonable and in 
breach of section 33.  
Furthermore, should the Council bend to the pressure put on it by its trading 
partners, as other African states have done, the Council‟s decision may be based on 
ulterior motives or become arbitrary, violating the right further.  
 Checks and balances need to be put in place to restrict the decision-making 
process in such a way that it complies with all of SA‟s international law obligations 
and takes into account all truly relevant factors involved in taking such measures, 
economic as well as sanitary, protecting the right of exporters to fair administrative 
action . 
5.4 Recommendations 
5.4.1 Checks and Balances 
The Act needs to set firm parameters of considerations which are imperative to be 
taken into account in the decision-making process. The considerations mandated by 
the SPS Agreement need to be imported into national legislation along with those of 
the Protocol, most specifically with regard to taking into account the measure‟s effect 
on international trade with a view to minimizing negative trade effects.
373
 It should 
specifically consider the impact of its decision on developing countries,
374
 so as not 
to cause such harsh effects on the developing world as the measures taken by the EC 
have done. Even if this acts only as an administrative mandate, it will lessen the 
negative effects of such decisions in general. 
It is specifically important that the proportionality requirement, as set out in 
the SPS Agreement, is mandated in SA law that the measure taken must not be more 
restrictive on trade than is necessary.
375
 By allowing itself the protection of the PP, 
SA will be able to uphold its human rights obligations to some extent. However, so 
as not to violate its trade obligations in the process, the legislation needs to ensure 
that there is an obligation on the decision-maker to seek legal certainty on the issue 
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after taking the measure,
376
 so as not to effect an unnecessary blanket ban on GMO 
trade, with a mandatory review of the measure within a reasonable time.
377
  
5.4.2  Liability and Redress Measures 
In order to mitigate its liability for breaching the right of its people to a safe and 
healthy environment should permitted GMO‟s actually cause harm, it is necessary 
for the legislature to create proper liability and redress measures.  
The existing legislation does do this to some extent. Section 17(1) of the 
GMO Act places an obligation on the user of the GMO to ensure that appropriate 
measures are taken to avoid an adverse impact on the environment which may arise 
from its use. „User‟ implies „a person who conducts an activity with a genetically 
modified organism‟.
378
 This is a broad definition, including anyone from consumers 
to farmers. 
If the user does not take such measures, he is guilty of an offence
379
 for which 
he is liable to pay a fine or face imprisonment of not more than two years.
380
 Section 
17(2) states that „liability for damage caused by the use or release of a genetically 
modified organism shall be borne by the user concerned‟. This is without 
qualification in the Act, a particularly harsh provision. It entails a deviation from the 
fault principle normative to the law of delict in SA law, creating an instance of strict 
liability, meaning the end user will be liable to pay for the damage caused by the 
GMO even if there is no fault
381
 on his part.
382
 
The only proviso on this exists when harm is caused by the GMO while in the 
possession of an inspector as set out in section 15(4),
383
 whereby the user concerned 
will not be held liable for any damage unless he foresaw or should have foreseen 
such damage would occur and could or should have prevented the damage but failed 
to take reasonable action to prevent it. This imports an element of negligence into the 
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otherwise strict liability created by the provision, mirroring the reasonable person 
test for negligence used in delict.
384
  
As it stands, without any qualification to the contrary, should any harm at all 
be caused by a GMO, the last person to use it will be liable for the damage, without 
the possibility of justification, except in the instance that an inspector possessed the 
GMO when it was released and caused harm, in which the user will only be liable if 
he was also negligent. Undeniably, this position is may have very heavy 
consequences as the cost of damage may be extremely high. It does not serve the 
interests of the state or the wronged parties to institute a claim for damages against a 
poor end user, who in any event cannot pay the amount of damages due to financial 
insufficiency.  
Under the current legislative system, should harm ensue from a GMO in the 
possession of a consumer, who did not know the GMO status of the item as there is 
no mandatory labelling requirements for GMO‟s in SA law, the consumer in question 
will be guilty of a criminal offence under the GMO Act for failing to take measures 
to prevent damage to the environment and the consumer will also be liable to pay the 
full cost of damages for the harm, even if it is exorbitant and far reaching in nature, 
without the safety of a compensation fund. This is despite the fact that there was no 
fault on the part of the consumer. This situation is untenable and most certainly does 
not meet the ends of justice, for anyone involved.  
The creation of a compensation fund by a state for the purpose of 
compensating environmental harm caused by GMO‟s is highly useful given the 
important nature of the environmental interest which needs redress despite financial 
insufficiency.
385
  Certain International Conventions place a duty on states to create 
such a fund, while also putting ceiling amounts on the quantum of damages which 
can be claimed.
386
 SA would be wise to voluntarily institute the mechanism of a 
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compensation fund in this instance. SA law already has compensation funds in place, 
such as the Road Accident Fund
387
 and the Compensation for Occupational Injuries 
and Diseases Fund,
388
 around which it can structure a fund for GMO-caused damage, 
perhaps funded in part by a portion of the tariff attached to GMO imports. 
 Furthermore, the Act does not actually define what the „harm‟ caused by 
GMO‟s entails. „Environmental harm‟ lacks clear and concise international 
definition.
389
 There is no significance to compensation if there is no actual concept of 
what must be paid for and how much this should be.
390
 Environmental damage may 
be continuous, contingent and unending, especially when one considers the inter-
connectivity of ecosystems. Putting a price on this type of damage presents an 
enormous problem to the judiciary. Boundaries need to be put in place by the 
legislature itself in order to define this concept which it intended to regulate with his 
provision, short of which, patrimonial and non-patrimonial damage
391
 will have to be 
ascertained using the traditional methods entrenched in the law of delict but this 
remains difficult. 
A better provision existed in the Consumer Protection Bill under clause 
61(1), which placed liability for damage caused by GMO‟s, which did not fall under 
the ambit of the GMO Act, on the producer or importer, distributor or retailer of the 
GMO‟s, irrespective of whether there was any negligence on the part of this person. 
The „harm‟ contemplated was also given parameters, being limited only to a number 
of instances
392
 including patrimonial loss.
393
 However, this provision was removed 
from the bill and does not appear in the final Act, based on the premise that it would 
cause confusion with regard to GMO regulation which is better left under the GMO 
Act‟s provisions. This is somewhat true to the extent that limiting the clause‟s 
application to only GMO‟s not under the regulation of the GMO Act leaves 
extremely few cases to which the clause applies and therefore is not very helpful 
with regard to liability and redress measures caused by GMO‟s. 
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 Such could emanate from damage to the environment in the form of a loss to humanity and the 
world of its biodiversity. 
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However, it is obvious that placing the burden of strict liability for harm 
caused by the GMO on the supplier of the product is a far more beneficial measure 
than the current position. The supplier, usually a juristic person of substantial wealth, 
hence in a better position to compensate for the damage, is in a better position to 
know of the dangers posed by the GMO (or, in fact, that the product is a GMO at all 
given the absence of mandatory labelling provisions) and to resultantly take steps to 
prevent the harm form occurring. Such a burden will also increase incentive on 
suppliers to uphold high quality consumer standards of safety. For policy reasons 
based on fairness and justice, strict liability is justified in such an instance and the 
public at large will be better served by this position.  
Legislative reform in this regard is most certainly needed before the flaws in 
the current position are uncovered in immense and unnecessary litigation. 
5.5  Biosafety Law and Consumer Protection Law 
5.5.1 The Consumer Protection Act 
In April 2009, The Consumer Protection Act (CPA)
394
 came into force in SA. It will 
only gain full effect of all of its provisions 24 months after its enactment,
395
 but its 
growing prominence cannot be ignored. It gives effect to the UN guidelines on 
Consumer Protection,
396
 with a uniquely South African slant. The eight principles for 
consumer rights embodied in the Act,
397
 surrounding which the Act‟s provisions are 
structured, deviate from the UN guidelines in order to make them in line with the 
human rights objectives of SA‟s Constitution. 
 The Act applies to every transaction occurring in SA, 
398
 save certain 
exemptions
399
 and applies irrespective of whether the supplier of the goods has its 
business outside of the RSA,
400
 is the state,
401
 or supplies goods under a license via 
public regulation,
402
 such as under the GMO Act, leaving GMO‟s and their products 
subject to the requirements of the Act.  
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5.5.2 To Label or Not to Label 
In terms of the CPA, consumers have the right to choose.
403
 This entails being free to 
select products based on their own beliefs and convictions without restriction. 
Coupled with this right, consumers also have the right to disclosure of 
information,
404
 through which the exercise of the right to choose is given effect. 
Furthermore, consumers in SA have the right to fair value, good quality and 
safety,
405
  which cannot be compromised by an unqualified sanction of potentially 
harmful products. 
Despite SA‟s WTO law obligations relating to the principle of non-
discrimination,
406
 even if GMO‟s pass government approval under the Act, it is not 
fair on consumers to introduce them simply as other conventional products. Should 
GMO products be against the ethical or religious beliefs of a consumer and the 
consumer is unknowingly subjected to these products, not only is the consumer‟s 
right to freedom of choice under the CPA breached, but indirectly, it would violate 




The problem could be solved with the implementation of a labelling 
requirement for all GMO‟s and their products, leaving the choice whether to 
consume these products or not up to the discretion of the consumer. However, SA‟s 
attempts to do this have been unsuccessful to date. At the end of 2008, the adoption 
of the Consumer Protection Bill was postponed due to a seemingly irreconcilable 
bone of contention amongst Parliament regarding the compulsory labelling of 
consumer products containing GMO‟s, as provided for in the Bill.
408
 The bill 
originally stated that:  
„any person who produces, supplies, imports or packages any 
prescribed goods must display on or in association with the packaging of 
those goods a notice in the prescribed manner and form that discloses the 
presence of any genetically modified ingredients or components of those 
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This would have instituted a mandatory labelling requirement on all GMO products 
in SA. However, the clause was removed from the final version of the CPA, an 
action which resulted in the Act finally being adopted.  
The position in SA due to this legislative omission regarding GMO labelling 
now, is that a voluntary option is given to suppliers to label the GMO status of an 
item or not. This sharp turn away from the principles of the Act is a direct steering 
toward the current position held by the USA regarding labelling of these products.
410
 
This means that SA consumers eat a variety of GMO products unknowingly, with no 
recourse against this practice. 
This provision was removed from the first draft of the bill „after concerns 
raised by the Department of Agriculture around the cost of the labelling and the 
technical expertise required to regulate safety issues’
411 but the clause was reinstated 
after the Department of Trade and Industry argued that technical aspects of GMO 
safety were addressed in the GMO Act and „[n]o substantial cost implications were 
expected and the Bill did not prescribe how the labelling must be done.‟
412
 The final 
exclusion of the clause from the Act was based on the Department of Agriculture‟s 
cost argument in the end, a sad decision wholly incongruent with the purport and 
objectives if the CPA as a whole, one which has been largely criticised by the 
general public and NGO‟s alike.
413
 
It cannot be ignored that labelling requirements on GMO products may 
constitute a violation of the WTO principle of non-discrimination. It is likely that 
SA‟s decision to ultimately remove this clause from the CPA was based on this 
consideration. It is unacceptable that this occurs at the expense of violating its 
consumer and human rights obligations. Even in terms of WTO law, in so far as 
labelling requirements are a measure put in place to protect health and safety, they 
will constitute a valid exception to the to the principle of non-discrimination in the 
form of an SPS measure, so long as the requirements of the SPS Agreement are met. 
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However, to the extent that the labelling requirements only give effect to the 
consumer‟s right to choose, they will not qualify as SPS measures and may well be a 
violate the principle. This latter position is not acceptable. Consumer rights cannot 
simply be ignored and with a global movement towards their legal recognition,
414
an 
exception to this rule which would accommodate labelling requirements is definitely 
needed. 
That being said, it is not difficult to perceive that a consumer‟s choice 
regarding GMO products will undoubtedly be premised upon what the consumer 
perceives to be safe. As GMO‟s are still uncertain to cause harm, it is possible to 
justify labelling requirements on GMO products on the fact that they warn the 
consumer of potential harm inherent in the GMO, which is uncertain to occur. In this 
way, labelling requirements still qualify as SPS measures. If the SPS Agreement is 
complied with, the negative impact of such measures on trade will be mitigated, 
while the state in question will be legally justified in its actions. To this effect, other 
WTO member states in a similar position have chosen to implement labelling 
requirements, the EC,
415
 Japan, Australia and New Zealand among them.
416
  
The EC‟s labelling requirements are particularly extensive. It implements 
mandatory labelling requirements for „foods that are delivered as such to the final 
consumer or mass caterers in the Community‟,
417
 which either consist of or contain 
GMO‟s; or which are produced from GMOs.
418
 These products must be labelled 
irrespective of whether the DNA or protein resulting from genetic modification of 
the organism exists at all in the final product, meaning „[t]he process or production 
method of the GM food or feed is now a relevant factor.‟
419
  A threshold requirement 
exists, as „[t]he presence of GM material in conventional food does not have to be 
labelled if it is below 0.9 per cent and if it can be shown to be adventitious and 
technically unavoidable‟.
420
 EC countries have implemented the rule as meaning a 
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GMO content of more than 0.9 per cent in each ingredient of a product.
421
 A 
traceability system for GMO‟s was also implemented.
422
  
The EC‟s labelling requirements have stirred up much controversy. The strict 
nature of these labelling provisions has proved to be too expensive for companies to 
comply with, which resultantly impacts international trade negatively.
423
 This does 
not comply with the SPS Agreement‟s mandate that the measure taken should not be 
more trade-restrictive than is necessary, taking into account technical and economic 
feasibility.
424
 There are cost-effective alternatives to limiting the risk
425
  that have not 
been considered by the EC. Furthermore, it did not attempt to minimize negative 
effects on trade
426
 of its measures, aggravating them instead.  
It is likely that the EC‟s version of GMO labelling measures violate WTO 
law. However, this does not have to be the case in SA. It is possible to implement 
mandatory labelling requirements which comply with the SPS Agreement‟s 
obligations. If mandatory labelling was instituted which was reasonable and 
practical, this would not cause too much of a burden on suppliers while still giving 
effect to the consumer‟s right to choose. Such would include all GMO-foods and 
foods with at least a significant percentage of GMO‟s in its overall ingredients to be 
mandatorily labelled as „containing GMO‟s‟, while items which the supplier knows 
or reasonably believes to contain GMO‟s falling under this percentage are to be 
mandatorily labelled with the catch-all phrase „may contain GMO‟s‟, with a 
justification to the effect that a GMO content which was unforeseen, adventitious or 
technically impossible to detect is exempt from labelling. Items which no longer 
show any traces of GMO‟s should not be subject to labelling – this position is overly 
stringent and illogical. This would cut out the costs involved in such testing for 
suppliers, while still giving enough notice of the GMO content of foods to consumers 
for them to make informed choices, an overall least restrictive means to achieve the 
same purpose of giving heed to consumer rights. „With labelling, informed 
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consumers can maximize their utility, relative prices will reflect their choices, and 
the gains from trade will be maximized.‟
427
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6. Conclusion 
With the international legal regime as it is, despite the theoretically authoritative 
sanction of the Cartagena Protocol to prohibit GMO imports  in terms of the PP, it is 
difficult to see how a party which is also a member of the WTO will ever be able 
invoke this principle without breaching its obligations in terms of WTO law. This is 
a highly detrimental position for states to be in. Despite the potential negative effects 
of a strict invocation of the PP, it remains a highly necessary mechanism by which a 
state can protect its vital interests in cases where risks remain scientifically uncertain 
to occur, as in the case of GMO‟s. This instance cannot be ignored, as the SPS 
Agreement does, due to the fact that a very real possibility exists that future harm 
might actually arise from GMO‟s which have been proven to be scientifically 
uncertain in terms of their safety. Should this harm actually arise and the state in 
question did not invoke precautionary measures to prevent the harm before it 
realised, it will be liable to its own nationals for this damaged caused, which it 
otherwise had the power to mitigate or prevent. 
 In SA, this is especially the case. The state is mandated to protect, promote 
and fulfil the constitutionally entrenched right to a safe and healthy environment of 
all its people. The fact that the SPS Agreement does not sanction taking 
precautionary action in the interests of health and safety, based merely on 
scientifically uncertain risks, does not preclude SA‟s government from this 
obligation, leaving it liable for harm caused by GMO‟s it did not prevent from 
import, despite it knowing that scientifically uncertain risks were inherent in the 
GMO‟s in question.  
 There is certainly a need for reformation of the international position. The 
SPS Agreement should sanction some form of provisional SPS measures in the case 
of scientifically uncertain risks, to accommodate all states and their obligations. The 
negative effects of this can be mitigated by all the factors which the SPS Agreement 
already mandates in relation to taking provisional SPS measures, most specifically 
by aiming to mitigate the negative trade effects of the measure; ensuring that the 
measure is not a disguised restriction on trade; taking into account the effects of the 
measure on developing countries; and most importantly, mandating that the state 
search for certainty on the issue and necessarily review the measure within a 













 Similarly, the Cartagena Protocol needs to be amended to reflect these 
considerations. Especially, it should mandate an enquiry into the effects that the 
precautionary measures it sanctions have on international trade and especially on 
developing countries. Even for countries which do not bear obligations in terms of 
WTO law, it is not tolerable that the effects of measures taken in terms of the 
Protocol, however vital to protect biodiversity, health and safety, impact so 
negatively on other countries, biotechnology and international trade without even an 
obligation to consider these goals or take a less restrictive measure. 
 Until this is resolved on an international level, SA can only amend its own 
position with regard to GMO trade in this way. National legislation should mandate 
checks and balances to the decision to allow GMO trade or not, including an 
obligatory enquiry into the trade and socio-economic effects of the measures taken, 
making sure that the measures are temporary and that an obligation to seek certainty 
on the risks, as well as mandatory review of the measures after a reasonable period of 
time, take place.  
Even with these improvements, however, SA is not safe from incurring 
liability for breach of its WTO obligations should it actually invoke the PP and 
prohibit GMO imports. Therefore, SA is well advised to rather make its risk 
assessment measures before allowing GMO imports and its risk management 
measures after import more comprehensive, than to invoke the PP and prevent GMO 
imports based on scientific uncertainty. This position would be improved by 
implementing post-import monitoring of GMO‟s and a responsible liability and 
redress framework should GMO‟s actually cause harm. This situation is not ideal but 
its practical effect is to ensure that SA allows vibrant GMO trade while still 
protecting the rights of its people as much as possible, under constitutionally-
sanctioned action. 
 Change is undoubtedly needed in all levels of legislation regulating trade in 
biotechnology. Given the vital humanitarian and commercial concerns involved, as 
trade in GMO‟s becomes ever expanding, this anomaly in the legal framework 
regulating their trade is untenable. Law, science and ethics need to unite on this 
issue, keeping abreast with the modern world, while the global question of whether 
we can afford to trade in GMO‟s moves rather to a consideration of whether we can 

















World Trade Organisation Panel, Appellate Body and GATT Panel 
Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages Reports of the Panel WT/DS87/R, 
WT/DS110/R 15 June 1999. 
Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages AB-1999-6 WT/DS87/AB/R  
WT/DS110/AB/R 13 December 1999. 
European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products –  
Hormones, WT/DS26/AB/R, and WT/DS48/AB/R 16 January 1998. 
European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech  
Products - First Submission by the United States WT/ DS292/R, 
WT/DS293/R and WT/294/R 21 April 2004. 
European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech  
Products - First Submission by the European Communities WT/DS292/R, 
WT/DS293/R and WT/DS295/R 17 May 2004 
European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech  
Products WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R and WT/DS293/R 29 September  
2006. 
Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/R, 27 October 1998,  
and WT/DS76/AB/R 22 February 1999. 
Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R 
  26 November 2003 
Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, GATT Panel Report BISD 31S/94, 
2 March 1984. 
Korea – Measures affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef Report of the  
Appellate Body AB-2000-8 WT/DS161/AB/R WT/DS169/AB/R 11 
December 2000. 
Spain - Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee GATT Panel Report BISD S25/49 11  
June 1981. 
 
European Court of Justice 
Cases T-144/00, T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00 and T-141/00  
Artegodan a.o. v. Commission [2002] ECR 4945 
Case 180/96 UK v Commission [1996] ECR 3903, at 61 
 
International Court of Justice 
South West Africa, Second Phase 1966 ICJ Reports 6. 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 1969 ICJ Reports 3. 
















Trial Smelter Arbitration (1938-1941) 3 RIAA 
 
South Africa 




The Agricultural Pest Act No. 36 of 1983. 
The Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act No. 130 of 1993.  
The Consumer Protection Act No. 68 of 2008. 
The Consumer Protection Bill of 2008 (C Draft) and (D Draft). 
The Constitution of South Africa 1996. 
Genetically Modified Organisms Act No. 15 of 1997. 
Genetically Modified Organisms Amendment Act No. 23 of 2006 and Regulation  
(576) No. 1420, 26 November 1999. 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No 3 of 2000. 




The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). 
 The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 
Office of Science and Technology Policy, Coordinated Framework for  
Biotechnology, Federal Register 51 pp 23302 – 23350, 26
th
 June 1986. 
The Plant Protection Act (PPA). 
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). 
 
European Union 
EU Regulation No. 1829/2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed. 
EU Regulation 178/2002. 
Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15  
July 2003 on Transboundary Movements of Genetically Modified Organisms. 















South African Development Community 
SADC Advisory Committee Recommendations on Biotechnology and Biosafety  
Available at 
http://www.sadc.int/fanr.php?lang=english&path=fanr/agrres&page=sadc_bi
otechnology_gmo [Accessed 27 July 2009]. 
 
International Conventions and Instruments 
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) 
The Convention on Biological Diversity Rio De Janero 1992 
The Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal 2000. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 19941867 UNTS 190 
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (1967) 6 ILM 363  
(1967). 
The Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (1960). 
The Marrakesh Agreement (1994) 1867 UNTS 3 
United Nations Guideline on Consumer Protection 1985 (as expanded in 1999). 
The 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de  
Janero (the Rio Declaration) 31 ILM 874 (1992). 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (1969) 8 ILM 679. 
The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (1963).   
Secondary Sources 
Books and Publications 
Alemanno, A Trade in Food: Regulatory and Judicial approaches in the EC and  
WTO (2007) Cameron May, London. 
Bowman M and Boyle A E et al. Environmental Damage in International and  
Comparative law (2002) Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Christoforou T The Precautionary principle in European Community Law and  
Science in Tickner J A (ed.)  Precaution, Environmental Science, and 
Preventive Public Policy (2003) Island Press, Washington, DC. 
Cosbey A and Burgiel S, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: An analysis of  
results. An IISD Briefing Note The International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, Winnepeg (2000) 
Dugard, J International Law: A South African Perspective (2005) 5
th
 ed, Juta and Co,  
Landsdown. 
de Sadeleer, N Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules  
(2005) Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Eklöf G ‘Miljön på undantag – de internationella miljöavtalen och WTO’ (2004)  
Forum Sydförlag, Stockholm, Sweden. 
Francioni, F Biotechnologies and International Human Rights (2007) Hart  
Publishing, Oxford.  
Francioni, F and Scovazzi, T Biotechnology and International Law (2006) Hart  
Publishing, Oxford. 














Milavec M Traceability Measures Department of Plant Physiology and  
Biotechnology National Institute of Biology available at 
www.coextra.eu.traceability.HR.en.html [Accessed 2009]. 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group Consumer Protection Bill [B19C-2008]:  
Departmental briefing & National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute Bill: 
Department of Minerals and Energy briefing & adoptionAvailable at 
http://www.pmg.org [Accessed 2009]. 
Report of The Office of the Registrar of the South African GMO Act 15 of 1997 The  
GMO Act  15 of 1997  (Act no 15 of 1997) and GMO Application  
Process. Available at www.agric.za [Accessed 10 March 2009] 
Statement of the EU  Position of the European Union on Sanctions against  
Zimbabwe available at www.delzwe.ec.europa.eu/en [Accessed 2009].  
Sunstein, C R Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (2005) Cambridge  
University Press, Cambridge. 




Baker A „The Consumer Protection Bill and labelling o f genetically modified  
organisms‟ (23 October 2008) News – Commercial Aspects of IP available at 
www.adamsandadams.co.za [Accessed 2009]. 
Bohannon, J „Zambia Rejects GM Corn on Scientists‟ Advice‟ (2002)  
Sciene,1153 available at 
www.bioutexas.edu/courses/stuart/zambiareject.pdf [Accessed 24 April 
2009]. 
Börjeson, N „WTO, GMO and the Precautionary Principle- the conflict between  
trade liberalisation and environmental protection‟ (2007) Master-Level 
Thesis, Södertörn University College Department of Life Sciences 
Environment and Development, available at 
http://www.essays.se/essay/5f8da94f2c/  [Accessed 12 June 2009]. 
CropBiotech Update „US to Strengthen biotech regulation for GMOs‟ (6 February  
2004) Available at 
http://www.isaaa.org/kc/cbtnews/bcentral/cbtupdate.htm#us [Accessed 27 
June 2009] 
Kinderlerer, J „The Regulatory System in the EU and Further Afield‟(2004) vol. 10  
No. 3 Journal of Commercial Biotechnology 248. 
Lee B „GM resistant: Europe and the WTO Panel Dispute on biotech products‟ The  
Centre for Business Relationships, Accountability, Sustainability and Society 
available at http://www.brass.cf.ac.uk/uploads/GMdispute.Pdf [Accessed 4 
September 2009]. 
Matthee, M and Vermersch. „Are the Precautionary Principle and the international  
trade of genetically modified organisms reconcilable?‟ (2000) Nr 12 Journal  
of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 59. 
Mayet, M „An Analysis of South Africa‟s Genetically Modified Organisms Act of  
1997‟ (2000) Biowatch SA available at www.biowatchsa.net [Accessed 10  
May 2009]. 
Mayet, M „Comments on the Genetically Modified Organisms Amendment Bill  













http://www.africabio.net [Accessed 10 May 2009].  
Mayet, M „Submissions on the South Africa‟s Genetically Modified Organisms Bill‟  
(2004) African Centre for Biosafety available at http://www.africabio.net  
[Accessed 10 May 2009]. 
Mayet, M „Critical Analysis of Pertinent LegislationRegulating Genetic Modification  
of Food and Agriculture in South Africa‟ (2001) Biowatch South Africa 
available at www.biowatchsa.net [Accessed 10 May 2009]. 
Nordlee et al. „Brazil nut gene – the truth‟ (1996) 334 (11) New England J Medicine  
688. Available at www.Africabio.com/biotechsa [Accessed 20 May 2009]. 
Qureshi A H „The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the WTO: Coexistence or  
Incoherence?‟ (2000) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 
49, Nr. 4. 835. 
Safrin 2002. „Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade 
Organization Agreements‟ (2002) Vol.96 Nr. 3 The American Journal of 
International Law 606. 
Schoenbaum, T.J. 2000. „International Trade in Living Modified Organisms: The  
NewRegimes‟ The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 49,  
Nr. 4. 856-866. 
Sheldon, IM „Regulation of Biotechnology: Will We Ever Freely Trade GMO‟s?‟  
 (2002) 29 European Review of Agricultural Economics 155. 
Spreij M „The SPS Agreement and Biosafety‟ (2007) 65 FAO Legal Papers Online  
available at http:// www.fao.org/legal/prs-ol/paper-e.htm [Accessed 4 
September 2009]. 
Treherne C „Safeage Submission re Consumer Protection Bill‟ available at  
http://www.Safeage.org [Accessed 10 August 2009]. 
Zarrilli S United Nations Conference on Trade and Development International  
„Trade in GMOs: Legal Frameworks and Developing Country Concerns‟ 




Buse, U „Montesanto‟s uphill battle in Germany‟ (14 March 2009) Spiegel Online  
via Checkbiotech available at http://www.spiegelonline.com [Accessed 2 
May 2009]. 
Chaffin, J „European ban on modified maize upheld‟ (4 March 2009) The  
Peninsula. 
Jasson da Costa W „Religious groups worried about GM foods‟ (19 January 2006)  
The Mercury, South Africa available at http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php 
[Accessed 10 August 2009]. 
Pressly D „Delay hits Consumer Protection Bill‟ (20 October 2008) Business  
Report. 
Mackenzie, J „French agency says Montesanto GM maize safe: report‟ (12  
February 2009) The Financial Times Ltd 2009. 
The Meridian Institute „France fined for delaying EU laws‟ (10 December 2008) 
 The Press Association. 
Meulin, J „USDA Unable to weed out unapproved modified foods‟ (15 January  
2009) Thompson Reuters. 
The Meridain Institute „GM free labels branded misleading in US‟ (13 January  













Tshisela N „Farmers pick GM food seeds‟ (3 March 2009) The Sowetan. 
„African countries 'forced' to accept GM food aid‟, ( 5 May 2004) Mail&Guardian  
Online available at http://www.mailandgaurdian.com   [Accessed 14 April 
2009]. 
„EU agrees Zimbabwe sanctions‟ (18 February 2002) BBC News Online available  
at http://news.bbc.co.uk [Accessed 2009]. 
„Food rations to be halved in Angola amid funding crisis and GM ban‟, 2 April  
2004, World Food Programme, In Brief available at 
www.wfp.org/newsroom/in_brief/Africa/angola/angola-040402.html 
[Accessed 14 April 2009]. 
„South African Government seeks law to extend support of GMOs‟ Reuters 20 Jan  
 2006 available at  http://www.genet-info.org/ [Accessed 4August 2009 ]. 
„Uganda gives cautious approval to GM food‟ Science and Development Network (2  
March 2004) available at 
http://www.scidev.net/News/index.cfm?fuseaction=readNews&itemid=1257
&language=1 [Accesssed 14 April 2009] 
„Zambia: History, Geography, Government and Culture‟ available at 
www.infoplease.com [Accessed 14 April 2009]. 
 „Zambia: Altapedia.Online‟ available at www.altapedia.com [Accessed 14 April  
2009]. 
 
Websites 
www.Africabio.com/biotechsa 
www.altapedia.com 
www.biowatchsa.net. 
http://www.dti.gov.za  
www.eisil.org  
www.essay.se.com 
www.europa.org 
www.gene.ch/genet 
www.gov.za 
http://www.itac.org.za  
www.infoplease.com  
http://news.bbc.co.uk. 
http://www.scidev.net  
www.wto.org 
www.wikipoedia.com 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
